Chapman Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 1

Article 2

2006

Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power: Why
Congress Must Reassert its Power to Determine
What is “Appropriate Legislation” to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment
Anthony Kovalchick

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
Recommended Citation
Anthony Kovalchick, Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power: Why Congress Must Reassert its Power to Determine What is “Appropriate
Legislation” to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 10 Chap. L. Rev. 49 (2006).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol10/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.

49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC

12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM

Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power:
Why Congress Must Reassert its Power to
Determine What is “Appropriate Legislation”
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
Anthony Kovalchick*

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................49
I. THE BATTLE OVER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT OF 1993 ................................................52
II. THE COLLISION BETWEEN FLORES AND SEMINOLE TRIBE .....61
A. The College Savings Bank and Florida Prepaid
Cases ...........................................................................63
B. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.............................70
C. United States v. Morrison ..........................................75
D. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett.........................................................................81
III. THE COURT’S RETREAT IN HIBBS, LANE AND GOODMAN ........86
A. Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs ...........................................................................86
B. Tennessee v. Lane .......................................................92
C. United States v. Georgia ............................................98
IV. THE COURT’S ASSERTION OF ITS OWN PROPHYLACTIC
POWER ..............................................................................104
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................110
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the past decade, the United States Supreme
* B.S. St. Vincent College, 1999; J.D. Duquesne University School of Law, 2002.
Admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Worked as a contract attorney for Choice
Counsel, Inc. and Robert Half Legal; a law clerk for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania; and a volunteer election day attorney for Bush/Cheney '04 in
Westmoreland County, PA.

49

49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC

50

12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:49

Court has pursued a rather meticulous course of evaluating the
constitutional bases for legislative enactments passed by Congress. This trend has not been limited to legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s authority under Article I of the United States
Constitution, but has extended to measures designed to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the same time, the Court has
vigorously defended its own authority to delineate the rights of
criminal defendants in various contexts, particularly with regard
to Miranda v. Arizona1 and its progeny. These seemingly unrelated matters have produced anomalous results regarding the
authority of each branch of the Federal Government to enforce
individual rights secured by the Constitution. For the sake of the
delicate balance of power that the Constitution was designed to
maintain, and for the welfare of those individuals who rightly invoke its provisions in court, the U.S. Supreme Court must retreat
from its present course of overreaching activism and permit Congress to exercise its constitutional authority to enact more sweeping legislation designed to protect individual rights.
As Justice Scalia noted in his dissenting opinion in Dickerson
v. United States, “[w]here the Constitution has wished to lodge in
one of the branches of the Federal Government some limited
power to supplement its guarantees, it has said so.”2 He was referring to provisions such as Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which states: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”3
Dickerson stands as perhaps the most obvious example of the
Court’s insistence that it somehow possesses the authority to
demand a little more than the Constitution actually requires in
order to guarantee that its provisions will not be eroded. Nevertheless, while the Court has recently taken such steps to expand
its own prophylactic power, it has simultaneously begun to limit
Congress’s authority to enact prophylactic legislation designed to
enforce the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
net result has been an unfortunate shift of constitutional prophylactic power from Congress to the federal courts.
The Court began to curtail congressional authority with regard to prophylactic legislation in its 1997 decision in City of
Boerne v. Flores,4 a year after its decision in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida.5 In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that the
Indian Commerce Clause did not give Congress the authority to
1
2
3
4
5

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
530 U.S. 428, 460 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity enjoyed by the
states.6 The case stands for the more general proposition that
while Congress may abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it validly enacts legislation under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not have that authority
when it acts pursuant to its powers under Article I.
Subsequently, these two decisions ended up on a collision
course. Congressional attempts to enforce various legal rights
against the states became subject to a complicated judicial inquiry into the constitutional bases of the underlying statutes creating substantive rights. Since Congress possesses the power to
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacts legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the Flores
rationale has begun to further limit Congress’s abrogation power.
Given the fact that legislation is often based on more than one
constitutional grant of power, some cases have presented the
question of whether Congress has the power to use the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity as an enforcement
mechanism to vindicate statutory rights that were created pursuant to Article I authority in conjunction with the powers derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause.
Consequently, the abrogation option has been denied to Congress
in instances where the Court has deemed the prophylactic legislation to be in excess of the power granted in Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, even where the underlying substantive
statutes have been concededly valid exercises of Article I power.
The net result of these cases has been a judicial usurpation
of the power to enforce the guarantees of the Constitution. On
the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has created its own prophylactic rules to protect the rights of criminal defendants and
has even divested Congress of the authority to replace them.7 On
the other hand, the Court has curtailed Congress’s authority to
enforce the rights contained within the Fourteenth Amendment,
notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution clearly grants
such enforcement authority to Congress and lacks any provision
implying that such authority exists in the Judiciary. If the Court
continues on this perilous course, Congress will have to take the
steps necessary to reassert its power to determine what legislation is “appropriate” in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 76.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (declaring Miranda to be “a constitutional rule that
Congress may not supersede legislatively”).
6
7
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I. THE BATTLE OVER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
OF 1993
On November 16, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act into law.8 The Act was passed
unanimously by the House of Representatives and with only
three dissenting votes in the Senate.9 It was enacted in response
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, which held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, does not require neutral laws
of general application that indirectly burden the free exercise of
religion to be narrowly tailored to secure a compelling state interest.10 As the Court explained in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, “a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice.”11 Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc., which was decided just five months before the Act was
signed into law, held that a challenged enactment must be “justified by a compelling interest” and “narrowly tailored to advance
that interest” in circumstances where “the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation.”12
In the “Findings and Declaration of Purposes” section of the
Act, Congress stated that “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere
with religious exercise.”13 The purposes of the Act were “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner14 and Wisconsin v. Yoder15 and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened,” as well as “to provide a claim or defense to persons
whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”16 The statute stated that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the
relevant governmental actor could demonstrate that the application of the burden to the individual was both “in furtherance of a
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2000).
Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1529 (9th Cir. 1997).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
Id. at 533.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2000).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(1)–(2).
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compelling governmental interest” and “the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”17
The Act permitted “[a] person whose religious exercise [had] been
burdened in violation” of the statutory mandate to “assert that
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government.”18
Prior to its invalidation as applied to the states in City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Act was upheld by three Courts of Appeals
in different applications. In Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Catholic University of America, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected a separation
of powers challenge to the statute brought by a litigant who contended that the law was an attempt by Congress to “overturn the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.”19
The Court of Appeals declared that the objective of Congress
“was to overturn the effects of the Smith decision, not the decision itself.”20 The Act, according to the Court of Appeals, did
“nothing more than substitute a statutory test for the constitutional test that Smith found not to be mandated by the Free Exercise Clause in cases where the right of free exercise was burdened by a neutral law of general application.”21 Nevertheless,
Catholic University was an easy case with regard to the Act because the relevant governmental actor was an agency of the federal government rather than that of a state.22 Congress undoubtedly possesses the authority to create exceptions to the
application of its own laws, provided that the exceptions themselves do not suffer from distinct constitutional infirmities.
Catholic University involved an application of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, making it unnecessary for the Court to
address the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s application to the states. Consequently, it was easy for
the Court to affirm the authority of Congress “to determine
against whom, and under what circumstances, Title VII and
other federal laws will be enforced.”23
It is worthy of note that the U.S. Supreme Court recently
applied the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, which involved a
claim by a small religious sect that its members were entitled to
“receive[] communion by drinking a sacramental tea, brewed
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. § 2000bb-1(a), (b)(1)–(2).
Id. § 2000bb-1(c).
83 F.3d 455, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 470.
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from plants unique to the [Amazon Rainforest], that contain[ed]
a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances Act by
the Federal Government.”24 The sect had obtained a preliminary
injunction blocking enforcement of the federal ban on the sacramental tea, and this grant of a preliminary injunction was ultimately affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court concluded that the courts below had not erred “in determining that
the [Federal] Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the [sect’s]
sacramental use of [the tea].”25 Absent such a showing, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act provided the sect with an exemption from the operation of the Controlled Substances Act.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was presented with a much more difficult case in Mockaitis v. Harcleroad,26 which involved the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act’s application to the State of Oregon. Coincidentally, it was
Oregon that had secured a victory in Smith, prompting Congress
to enact the statute in the first place. In Mockaitis, the Court of
Appeals relied on the Act, in part, to approve declaratory and injunctive relief against the taping of confessions in an Oregon
prison.27
Conan Wayne Hale was a suspect in three murders and two
burglaries.28 While he was in prison, nearly all of his conversations with visitors were taped, with the sole exception being
those conversations that he had with his attorney.29 The prison
authorities were implicitly authorized by an Oregon statute30 to
“intercept and record conversations between inmates and all visitors save their counsel.”31 Hale was fully aware of the fact that
approximately ninety percent of his conversations were being recorded.32
On April 22, 1996, Father Timothy Mockaitis heard Hale’s
confession in the jail’s visiting booths.33 Even though Hale was
not a Catholic, he was eligible to participate in the Sacrament of
Reconciliation because of his status as a baptized Christian.34
Following the usual protocol, the conversation was recorded. Al24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

126 S. Ct. 1211, 1216 (2006).
Id. at 1225.
104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1534.
Id. at 1525.
Id.
OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(2)(a)(B) (2005).
Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1529.
Id. at 1525, 1533.
Id. at 1525.
Id.
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though Hale was probably aware of the fact that the recording
was taking place, the Court of Appeals was clearly of the view
that Father Mockaitis had absolutely no knowledge whatsoever
about the taping of the confession.35
The very next day, Detective Jeffrey James Carley sought a
search warrant to obtain the tape of the confession, which was issued by Judge Bryant Hodges.36 Shortly thereafter, District Attorney Douglass Harcleroad obtained an order from Judge Kip
Leonard to “retain and seal the tape and to prohibit anyone who
knew its contents from divulging them without further order of
the court.”37 Ultimately, Father Mockaitis and Archbishop Francis E. George brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon seeking the destruction of both the tape itself
and the transcript which had been made from it.38 Judge Owen
Panner dismissed the action, and Father Mockaitis and
Archbishop George appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, relying on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Without extended debate, the Court of Appeals rejected the
State’s argument that the Act was an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress’s power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Using the U.S. Supreme Court’s language in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court of Appeals described Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as “a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”39 The Court found
the taping of the confession to be in violation of the Act because it
substantially burdened the cleric’s free exercise of religion. Although the State’s interest in obtaining evidence of criminal activity was assumed to be compelling, the taping of the confession
was not the “least restrictive means of furthering that [compelling governmental] interest” because the same kind of evidence
could be obtained through diligent work on the part of the police
and the detectives.40 The Court also found the recording to be in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because
Oregon’s rules of evidence, coupled with the “uniform respect for
the character of sacramental confession,” gave Father Mockaitis
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the conversation.41
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id. at 1524–25.
Id. at 1526.
Id. at 1526–27.
Id. at 1529 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
Id. at 1530.
Id. at 1532.
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The unique aspect of this case lies in the fact that Hale was
actually against the destruction of the tape.42 He contended that
he had confessed to committing the two burglaries but that he
had expressly denied committing the murders. Ironically, even
though Detective Carley originally sought the tape in order to
make the case against Hale, it was Hale who ultimately wanted
the tape for his defense. In fact, the Court of Appeals even noted
that it was “reasonable to infer that Hale hoped that his words
would be recorded and preserved.”43
In the end, the Court of Appeals agreed with Father
Mockaitis and Archbishop George in their argument for declaratory relief, holding that the secret taping of the confession violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as well as the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.44 The clergymen also obtained an injunction to “restrain Harcleroad and his agents and
employees from further violation of [the Act] and the Fourth
Amendment by assisting, participating in or using any recording
of a confidential communications [sic] from inmates of the Lane
County Jail to any member of the clergy in the member’s professional character.”45 These requests for relief were to be granted
by the District Court, on remand from the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, the Court did not see fit to order the destruction of
the tape, reasoning that the preservation of the tape for Hale’s
trial did not substantially burden Father Mockaitis and
Archbishop George in the exercise of their religion.46 After all,
Hale was always free to reveal the contents of his own confession.
Therefore, the Court permitted the tape to be preserved even as
it instructed the District Court to enjoin further violations of the
Act and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit likewise upheld the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in Flores v. City of
Boerne,47 but its decision was ultimately reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. In City of Boerne v. Flores,48 the Supreme Court
invalidated the Act as applied to the states. The case involved
St. Peter Catholic Church, which had been built in 1923 and was
only able to seat about 230 people.49 Archbishop P.F. Flores
granted permission to the parish to enlarge the building in order
to provide seating for the forty to sixty parishioners who were not
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 1533.
Id.
Id. at 1533–34.
Id. at 1534.
Id. at 1531.
73 F.3d 1352, 1363 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 511–12.
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accommodated at some Sunday Masses, but the City of Boerne’s
Historic Landmark Commission later denied the Archbishop’s
request for the necessary building permit on the ground that St.
Peter Church was located in a district that was designated as
historic. The Archbishop proceeded to bring a suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas challenging the
permit denial and using the Act as a basis for relief.50 Although
the District Court concluded that the Act exceeded Congress’s
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, its judgment was
reversed by the Court of Appeals on interlocutory appeal.51 Ultimately, however, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.52
The Court noted at the outset that the Act was specifically
designed to protect the free exercise of religion, applicable to the
states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, beyond the requirements of the Smith decision.53
Justice Kennedy, who authored the Court’s opinion, reiterated
the language in Ex parte Virginia by declaring:
“Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out
the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce
submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.”54

He also stated that “[l]egislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’s
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’”55
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy drew a sharp distinction between legislation designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
and legislation which attempts “to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation.”56 In Catholic University, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had said that
“Congress’s objective in enacting the [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] was to overturn the effects of the Smith decision, not the
decision itself.”57 In other words, while Congress lacked the authority to overrule the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
50 Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev’d, 73 F.3d 1352
(5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
51 Flores, 73 F.3d at 1362–65 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
52 City of Boerne v. Flores, 519 U.S. 926 (1996).
53 Flores, 521 U.S. at 512–13.
54 Id. at 517–18 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879)).
55 Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
56 Id. at 519.
57 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Court of Appeals sustained Congress’s power to “substitute a statutory test
for the constitutional test that Smith found not to be mandated
by the Free Exercise Clause in cases where the right of free exercise was burdened by a neutral law of general application.”58
Catholic University, however, did not involve the Act’s application to the states, making it easy for the Court of Appeals to assert that Congress possesses “at least the facial authority to determine against whom, and under what circumstances, Title VII
and other federal laws will be enforced.”59 There was no question
that Congress had legislative jurisdiction to limit the application
of neutral federal laws of general application, but Flores posed a
more difficult question because the Act purported to limit the application of state law.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, given
that the latter was incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court did not view the Act as a
valid enforcement measure. Instead, the Court saw the statute
as an encroachment on its own interpretive authority and declared that “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is.”60 Justice Kennedy explained the applicable test for evaluating the constitutionality of Section Five
legislation by stating that “[t]here must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end.”61
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was found to fail the
congruence and proportionality test because it was not limited to
the deterrence of actual Free Exercise Clause violations. Instead, it was designed to displace the application of various state
laws even in instances where no constitutional violations were
present. The statute reached every incidental burden placed on
the exercise of religion by neutral laws of general application,
while the Constitution only reached those laws which directly
targeted religious practices for special legal burdens. The Court
noted that “[w]hen the exercise of religion has been burdened in
an incidental way by a law of general application, it does not follow that the persons affected have been burdened any more than
other citizens, let alone burdened because of their religious be-

58
59
60
61

Id.
Id. at 470.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 519.
Id. at 520.
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liefs.”62 Therefore, the Act was invalidated as applied to the
states, and it could not be used to vindicate Archbishop Flores in
his efforts to win an exemption from the application of the City of
Boerne’s ordinance governing the designation and maintenance
of historic landmarks.
Justice Stevens authored a short concurring opinion in which
he expressed the view that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
As he saw it, the statute had “provided the Church with a legal
weapon that no atheist or agnostic [could] obtain.”63 Citing the
Court’s decision in Wallace v. Jaffree,64 he declared that “[t]his
governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion,
[was] forbidden by the First Amendment.”65 Although he did not
specifically mention a distinction between the Act’s application to
federal or state law, Justice Stevens’ opinion can only be read as
a contention that the statute is likewise unconstitutional as applied to federal law.
The other Justices approached the issue as one regarding
legislative jurisdiction, with Justices O’Connor, Souter and
Breyer expressing the dissenting view that the underlying holding in Smith should be reexamined, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Scalia and Ginsburg adhering to
the view that the Act was simply in excess of Congress’s power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.66 To these eight Justices,
there would be no reason to question the constitutionality of the
Act as applied to the federal government because Congress would
not need to rely on Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
restrict the application of its own laws. Since Justice Stevens
saw the Act as a violation of the Establishment Clause, however,
his position must necessarily be that the Act is unconstitutional
in all of its applications. This logic can be inferred from the fact
that the Establishment Clause operates as a substantive limit on
the powers of Congress even when legislative jurisdiction is otherwise present. Although Justice Stevens joined the opinion of
the Court in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do
Vegetal, which involved the Act’s application to the federal government and vindicated the religious sect seeking relief under
the Act, there was no constitutional challenge brought against
the statute in that case.67
Id. at 535.
Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–55 (1985).
Flores, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 544–45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Id. at 565–66 (Souter, J., dissenting); Id.
at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Id. at 511 (majority opinion).
67 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1225 (2006).
62
63
64
65
66
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While invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in
Flores, the Court relied to some degree on South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,68 a precedent upholding the Voting Rights Act of
1965 as a valid exercise of Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court viewed the Voting Rights Act as being more directly related to enforcing the Constitution than the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, leaving one to infer that the Enforcement Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
should be construed in a similar manner because of the similarities in their wording.
Nevertheless, the Court made no attempt to distinguish its
precedents involving the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court
declared that, “[b]y its own unaided force and effect, the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, and established universal
freedom.”69 Justice Stewart, who delivered the opinion of the
Court, went on to say that “[w]hether or not the Amendment itself did any more than that—a question not involved in this
case—it is at least clear that the Enabling Clause of that
Amendment empowered Congress to do much more. For that
clause clothed Congress with power to pass all laws necessary
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in
the United States.”70 Jones upheld 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.”71
In Runyon v. McCrary,72 the Court again upheld sweeping
legislation as a valid exercise of Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment. Runyon upheld 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other.73

It cannot be doubted that these two statutes would fail the
“congruence and proportionality” test described in Flores if it
68
69
70
71
72
73

383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
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were to be applied in the Thirteenth Amendment context. These
legislative acts, though passed pursuant to Section Two of the
Thirteenth Amendment, cannot be said to be limited to the mere
enforcement of the underlying constitutional provision. There
are many actions which would violate either § 1981 or § 1982
without violating the Thirteenth Amendment itself. By choosing
to rely on its Fifteenth Amendment cases while ignoring its Thirteenth Amendment precedents, the Supreme Court left both a
hole in its rationale and a cloud over Congress’s power to enforce
the Civil War Amendments. The similar wording of these three
constitutional provisions, all of which delegated legislative power
to Congress that did not exist under the original Constitution,
leaves no principled reason for treating one radically different
from the other two.
It is, of course, true that the Thirteenth Amendment operates against a broader array of potential transgressors. While
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments limit only governmental entities, the Thirteenth Amendment limits governmental
and private actors alike.74 Although the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibitions have a broader target, the prohibitions themselves are far narrower than those contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The category of conduct which violates the Fourteenth Amendment is far more inclusive than that which violates
the Thirteenth Amendment, potentially leading one to the conclusion that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment should
be construed as a broader delegation of legislative authority than
Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. Notwithstanding
this reality, the holding in Flores appears to indicate the contrary, especially in light of the sweeping legislative enactments
upheld in Jones and Runyon.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not always reconciled its various decisions interpreting the Civil War Amendments, and its
cases have often led to implicit anomalies.75 Perhaps no anomaly
is more glaring in this area of the law, however, than the Court’s
recent practice of meticulously scrutinizing prophylactic legislation designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment after upholding such broad legislative mandates passed pursuant to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment in Jones and Runyon.
II. THE COLLISION BETWEEN FLORES AND SEMINOLE TRIBE
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Flores in 1997, it had
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Runyon, 427 U.S. 160.
See Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment: When Can Race Be
Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L., 735, 736 (2002).
74
75
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already decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida76 a year earlier. In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that the Indian Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with the authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity enjoyed by the
states.77 In so holding, the Court rejected its prior plurality decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which held that the Interstate Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity and declared that the federal power to
regulate interstate commerce would be “incomplete without the
authority to render States liable in damages.”78 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who authored the opinion of the Court in Seminole
Tribe, made it clear that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts
judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”79 The Court distinguished its decision in Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer,80 which held that Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment did grant Congress the authority to abrogate the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. In Seminole Tribe, Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained that “the Fourteenth Amendment,
adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and
the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the preexisting balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.”81
The principle that Article I does not give Congress the authority to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
remains the law despite the Court’s recent decision in Central
Virginia Community College v. Katz.82 In Central Virginia
Community College, the Court declared that “the power to enact
bankruptcy legislation was understood to carry with it the power
to subordinate state sovereignty, albeit within a limited
sphere.”83 Justice Stevens, who delivered the opinion of the
Court, explained that, “[i]n ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause, the
States acquiesced in a subordination of whatever sovereign immunity they might otherwise have asserted in proceedings necessary to effectuate the in rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts.”84 He went on to state that “Congress may, at its option,
either treat States in the same way as other creditors insofar as

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
See id. at 76.
491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
517 U.S. at 72–73.
427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65–66.
126 S. Ct. 990 (2006).
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1005.
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concerns Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies or exempt them
from operation of such laws.”85 This power, according to the
Court, “arises from the Bankruptcy Clause itself” and is not dependent on any purported abrogation of the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity by Congress.86 Therefore, Seminole Tribe
remains good law despite the Court’s holding in Central Virginia
Community College that “[a] proceeding initiated by a bankruptcy trustee to set aside preferential transfers by the debtor to
state agencies” is not barred by sovereign immunity.87
At first glance, one might conclude that Flores and Seminole
Tribe addressed wholly unrelated matters that one could not implicate in the same case. Nevertheless, the holdings in these two
decisions later collided to produce a situation in which Congress
was stripped of its power to provide the abrogation remedy in circumstances where federal legislative jurisdiction to enact the
substantive statutory provisions was beyond question. The problem began just two years after Flores was decided.
A.

The College Savings Bank and Florida Prepaid Cases

In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, the Court held that the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act did not validly abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity.88 Similarly, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court
held that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act did not validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity.89 Although the Patent Clause unambiguously gives Congress legislative jurisdiction to regulate the
subject matter, that provision could not be the basis for an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity because it is contained
in Article I of the Constitution. Congress amended the patent
laws in 1992 and “expressly abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity from claims of patent infringement,”90 but Seminole Tribe
foreclosed any argument to the effect that the Patent Clause, an
Article I power, provided Congress with the constitutional authority to do so. Therefore, pursuant to Fitzpatrick, the statutory
abrogations involved in these two cases could only be sustained if
they were validly enacted by Congress under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 994.
527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999).
527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999).
Id. at 630.
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In College Savings Bank, the Court rejected the argument
that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, which subjected
the states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the Trademark
Act of 1946 for “false and misleading advertising,”91 was a valid
exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Scalia, who delivered the
opinion of the Court, noted at the outset that under Flores, the
object of Section Five legislation “must be the carefully delimited
remediation or prevention of constitutional violations.”92 College
Savings Bank contended that Congress had passed the Act to
prevent state deprivations, without due process of law, of two
species of property rights. The first was characterized as “a right
to be free from a business competitor’s false advertising about its
own product,” and the second was described as “a more generalized right to be secure in one’s business interests.”93 The Court
was not convinced that either right qualified as a property right
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rejecting the first asserted right, the Court declared that
“[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”94 The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act bore
“no relationship to any right to exclude,”95 making College Savings Bank’s argument all the more difficult. Justice Scalia explained that “Florida Prepaid’s alleged misrepresentations concerning its own products intruded upon no interest over which
[College Savings Bank] had exclusive dominion.”96 He went on to
say that even if the tort of unfair competition could be viewed as
a mechanism to protect property interests, “not everything which
protects property interests is designed to remedy or prevent deprivations of those property interests.”97
The Court likewise rejected College Savings Bank’s second
alleged property interest. Reasoning that no business asset of
College Savings Bank was impinged upon by Florida Prepaid’s
false advertising, Justice Scalia made it clear that there was no
deprivation of property at issue in the case. While it was conceded that any state taking of business assets would qualify as a
deprivation of property under the Due Process Clause, College
Savings Bank was wholly unable to identify a loss of such an asset. Since the Court found no underlying violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, it saw no reason to consider whether the
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 669.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 674.
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prophylactic measure taken pursuant to Section Five was “genuinely necessary” to prevent an actual constitutional violation.98
It was also determined that Florida’s activities in interstate
commerce did not constitute a waiver of the state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity, leaving the federal courts without jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, took issue with the
Court’s determination that the Trademark Remedy Clarification
Act was not a valid exercise of Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He viewed a state’s “deliberate destruction of a going business” as “a deprivation of property within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause.”99 Emphasizing that the Act was a valid
exercise of Congress’s Section Five power, even if Florida Prepaid’s allegedly false advertising did not itself amount to a constitutional violation, he declared that “the validity of a congressional decision to abrogate sovereign immunity in a category of
cases” depended on “whether Congress had a reasonable basis for
concluding that abrogation was necessary to prevent violations
that would otherwise occur” rather than on “the strength of the
claim asserted in a particular case within that category.”100 Justice Stevens concluded his dissent by noting that Congress’s
judgment commanded more respect, especially in light of “the
presumption of validity that supports all federal statutes.”101
In Florida Prepaid, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a similar attempt by College Savings Bank to take advantage of a purported abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered savings bank, obtained a patent for a financing methodology “designed to guarantee investors sufficient funds to cover the costs of tuition for college[].”102 The Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, which was created by the State of Florida, administered
similar “tuition prepayment contracts” that were available to
residents of Florida. College Savings Bank ultimately brought a
patent infringement action against Florida Prepaid pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 271(a), arguing that Florida Prepaid had infringed its
patent by administering a distinct tuition prepayment program.
Two years before the action was brought, Congress had enacted
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification
Act, which abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity in patent inId. at 675.
Id. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
631 (1999).
98
99
100
101
102
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fringement cases.103 Nonetheless, Congress enacted the Act, with
its purported abrogation, before Seminole Tribe and Flores were
decided, making it necessary for the Court to determine the Act’s
constitutionality pursuant to the standards enunciated in those
cases.
Article I, Section Eight of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”104
This provision, however, could not sustain an abrogation of the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity because of the rule of
Seminole Tribe. Since Article I could not provide a basis for such
an abrogation, College Savings Bank contended that the Patent
Remedy Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment.105 Because Seminole Tribe foreclosed the arguments under the Patent and Interstate Commerce
Clauses, College Savings Bank sought refuge under the rule of
Fitzpatrick.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion of the
Court, first pointed out that Congress had “identified no pattern
of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”106 Moving on to the inquiry required under Flores, he noted that under Brown v. Duchesne107 and Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright,108 patents are property
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although College Savings Bank likewise argued that the
Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause, applicable to
Florida by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, provided an additional reason to justify prophylactic legislation under the Enforcement Clause, the Court did not agree.
Due to the fact that Congress had been “so explicit about invoking its authority under Article I and its authority to prevent a
State from depriving a person of property without due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment,” the Court viewed the
omission of the Just Compensation Clause from the statutory
text and the legislative history of the Patent Remedy Act as fatal
to College Savings Bank’s argument that the Just Compensation
Clause provided an alternative ground to uphold the statute.109

103
104
105
106
107
108
109

See id. at 631–32.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633.
Id. at 640.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1857).
94 U.S. 92 (1877).
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642 n.7.
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Reviewing the Patent Remedy Act under the Flores standard, the Court sought to identify the underlying constitutional
violation that Congress attempted to remedy. Relying on its
prior decisions in Parratt v. Taylor,110 Hudson v. Palmer,111 and
Zinermon v. Burch,112 the Court declared that “a State’s infringement of a patent, though interfering with a patent owner’s
right to exclude others, does not by itself violate the Constitution.”113 This is because a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest by a state actor does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment if the state actor provides due process.
What is unconstitutional, in this context, “is the deprivation of
such an interest without due process of law.”114 Therefore, the
Court made it clear that “only where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its
infringement of their patent could a deprivation of property
without due process result.”115 It was likewise noted that Florida
provided both a legislative remedy116 and a judicial remedy117 “to
patent owners for alleged infringement on the part of the
State.”118
While the Court was sympathetic to the “need for uniformity
in the construction of patent law,” it insisted that such a factor
belonged to the “Article I patent-power calculus” and not “to any
determination of whether a state plea of sovereign immunity deprives a patentee of property without due process of law.”119 The
Court went on to say that Congress, while enacting the Patent
Remedy Act, had focused on negligent infringements of patents
by the states and not on examples of reckless or intentional infringements. Under Daniels v. Williams, negligent conduct by a
state actor which results in an unintended injury to a person’s
liberty or property does not constitute a “deprivation” for Due
Process Clause purposes.120 Consequently, the Court was persuaded that Congress’s purported abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity was in response to various patent infringements by states in which no deprivations of property could
be established, let alone deprivations of property without due
451 U.S. 527 (1981).
468 U.S. 517 (1984).
494 U.S. 113 (1990).
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643.
Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643.
See Fla. Stat. § 11.065 (2005).
See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Fla. Dept. of Transp, 626 So.2d 1333, 1337
(Fla. 1993).
118 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 644 n.9.
119 Id. at 645.
120 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
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process of law. The Court emphasized that “Congress did nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable
constitutional violations, such as where a State refuses to offer
any state-court remedy for patent owners whose patents it had
infringed.”121 Congress made no “attempt to confine the reach of
the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of infringement,
such as nonnegligent infringement or infringement authorized
pursuant to state policy,” nor did it provide for suits “only against
States with questionable remedies or a high incidence of infringement.”122 Therefore, the Patent Remedy Act, unable to
pass the “congruence and proportionality” test established in Flores, was invalidated as being in excess of Congress’s power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was largely because the underlying state conduct, in most instances reached by
the statute, was not itself unconstitutional.
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, questioned whether the Daniels
standard for identifying a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest applied in the patent infringement context.123 He contended that “the Daniels line of cases ha[d] only
marginal relevance” to the case at hand because College Savings
Bank was alleging that Florida Prepaid’s infringement had been
willful.124 He also noted that it was reasonable for Congress to
assume that state remedies for patent infringement did not exist
because it “had long ago pre-empted state jurisdiction over patent infringement cases.”125 Justice Stevens went on to point out
that Alden v. Maine, which was decided that same day, and
which held that “the powers delegated to Congress under Article I . . . do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States
to private suits for damages in state courts,”126 would likely preclude Congress from requiring state courts to “entertain infringement actions when a State is named as a defendant.”127 He
asserted that the Patent Remedy Act passed the “congruence and
proportionality” test established in Flores because its sole purpose was to “abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity as a defense to a charge of patent infringement.”128 He reasoned that
“congruence [was] equally precise whether infringement of patents by state actors [was] rare or frequent,” since the impact of
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646–47.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 653 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 658.
527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 659 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 662.
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the statute would “expand in precise harmony with the growth of
the problem that Congress anticipated and sought to prevent.”129
This was because the statute would only apply in instances
where a state raised its sovereign immunity as a defense to a
patent infringement action, regardless of how common or rare
such infringements were.
Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, which were decided on the same day, were only the first examples of the problems created as a result of the collision between Seminole Tribe
and Flores. Nonetheless, they continue to serve as a stark illustration of the resulting enforcement anomaly. Although Article I
undoubtedly confers on Congress the legislative jurisdiction to
regulate patents and trademarks, Seminole Tribe prevents Congress from using that power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity in infringement cases. While Fitzpatrick
permits such an abrogation pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the narrow construction given to that constitutional provision in Flores significantly impedes the use of that
legislative option.
The power vested in Congress by the Copyright and Patent
Clause is very extensive, as was recently illustrated by the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft.130 In Eldred, the
Court declared that “the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to
prescribe ‘limited Times’ for copyright protection and to secure
the same level and duration of protection for all copyright holders, present and future.”131 In so holding, the Court rejected the
argument that “a time prescription, once set, becomes forever
fixed or inalterable.”132 Justice Ginsburg, who authored the opinion of the Court, likewise noted that the “congruence and proportionality” standard established in Flores was not applicable in
Eldred and could not be invoked to ensure that legislation extending copyrights was appropriately in pursuit of the purposes
of the Copyright and Patent Clause. She contrasted the two different constitutional provisions by saying that “Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce commands contained in and incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment,” while the Copyright and Patent Clause “empowers Congress to define the scope of the substantive right.”133 Consequently, the deference given to Congress
in the Article I context is much broader than that shown in Flores, which involved an interpretation of the Enforcement Clause.
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 662–63.
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Id. at 199.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 218.
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This deference, however, did not help College Savings Bank
because of the rule enunciated in Seminole Tribe. Notwithstanding the extensive nature of Congress’s authority under the Copyright and Patent Clause, the Eleventh Amendment operated as a
barrier to federal adjudicatory jurisdiction in Florida Prepaid
and College Savings Bank. The U.S. Supreme Court’s description of the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act and the Patent
Remedy Act as disproportionate attempts to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment may make some sense, but the broad nature
of these statutes is unsurprising when the timing of their enactment is considered. The Patent Remedy Act, for instance, was
enacted in response to Chew v. California,134 which was a 1990
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It
held that the patent statutes did not contain the clear statement
of Congress’s intent to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity
required under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon.135 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., issued in 1989, affirmed Congress’s authority to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause.136 Congress, relying on Union Gas Co., passed the Patent Remedy Act in 1992 and
abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent
infringement cases pursuant to its powers under the Patent
Clause, the Commerce Clause, and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Four years later, Seminole Tribe overruled
Union Gas Co. and made it clear that Article I powers cannot be
used to effect such abrogations.137 When the Patent Remedy Act
was passed, however, Congress saw no need to tailor the remedy
to the limits of its authority under the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, given that two clauses in Article I were
also being invoked and that Seminole Tribe had not yet been decided.
B.

Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents

The enforcement anomaly that began in 1999 with Florida
Prepaid and College Savings Bank continued into the Court’s
next term. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, as amended in 1974 to cover the states by abrogating
their sovereign immunity, was in excess of Congress’s power to
893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
473 U.S. 234 (1985).
491 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
137 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72–73.
134
135
136
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enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.138 The Act makes it illegal
for an employer, governmental or private, “to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
age.”139 It protects individuals age forty and over, subject to certain exceptions specifically enumerated in the text of the Act.
Various plaintiffs sued their state employers under the Act, alleging that they were discriminated against on the basis of age.140
The defendants contended that the Eleventh Amendment barred
the suits. The cases were consolidated on appeal by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the
states were immune from suits brought in federal court for violations of the Act.141 Ultimately, the cases reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
After conceding that Congress had unequivocally expressed
its intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity,
the Court went on to decide whether the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion of the
Court in Kimel was delivered by Justice O’Connor, who noted at
the outset that the application of the Act’s substantive provisions
to the states had already been upheld.142 In EEOC v. Wyoming,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Act was a valid exercise of
Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce, making it
unnecessary for the Court to determine whether Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment provided an alternative ground for
upholding the statute.143 The Eleventh Amendment, of course,
does not bar suits brought by the United States against a
state.144
In Kimel, however, the Court had to resolve the Enforcement
Clause question. Although EEOC had found the Act to be a valid
exercise of Congress’s power under the Interstate Commerce
Clause, the rule of Seminole Tribe prevented the plaintiffs in Kimel from using that precedent to assert federal adjudicatory jurisdiction.145 The Court began its discussion of the Enforcement
Clause issue by declaring that Congress’s power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment “includes the authority both to remedy
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (1998), aff’d, 528 U.S. 62.
See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78.
460 U.S. 226 at 243 (1983).
See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001).
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78–79.
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and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which
is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.”146 Nonetheless,
it was also noted that the determination of “whether purportedly
prophylactic legislation constitutes appropriate remedial legislation, or instead effects a substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth Amendment right at issue, is often difficult.”147
Despite any perceived difficulty posed by the question, the
Court concluded that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
was not a valid exercise of Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Act’s substantive provisions were “disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably
could be targeted.”148 Relying on its prior decisions in Gregory v.
Ashcroft,149 Vance v. Bradley,150 and Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,151 the Court explained that “States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”152 This is because age is not
a suspect classification for Equal Protection Clause purposes.
Age classifications made by a state are not inherently suspect because older persons have not been subject to a “history of purposeful unequal treatment,”153 nor are they members of a “discrete and insular minority.”154 Unlike classifications based on
race or gender, age classifications cannot properly be characterized as “so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate
state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.”155 Therefore, as the
Court made clear in Kimel, “a State may rely on age as a proxy
for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant
to the State’s legitimate interests,” even though age may prove to
be an “inaccurate proxy” from time to time.156
According to the Court, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act required far more of state employers than did the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act included exceptions permitting employers to defend themselves
against suits by demonstrating that age was “a bona fide occupa146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
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156

Id. at 81 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)).
Id. at 81 (citing Flores, 521 U.S. at 519–20).
Id. at 83.
501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991).
440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979).
427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (per curiam).
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84.

49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC

2006]

12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM

Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power

73

tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the particular business” or that “the differentiation [was]
based on reasonable factors other than age.”157 The plaintiffs argued that these exceptions narrowed the reach of the Act,
thereby making it a more “congruent” and “proportional” prophylactic measure designed to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause.158 The Court rejected this argument, however, because it
had narrowly construed these exceptions in Western Air Lines,
Inc. v. Criswell159 and Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,160 leaving the
Act’s substantive requirements “at a level akin to [the Court’s]
heightened scrutiny cases under the Equal Protection Clause.”161
The Act, so construed, prohibited employers from using age as a
proxy for other characteristics related to an employee’s work.
Given that construction, the Act’s protection was deemed to extend far beyond that provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court went on to say that “Congress’s failure to uncover
any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination” only
served to confirm that “Congress had no reason to believe that
broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this field.”162
Justice O’Connor explained that Congress’s purpose for enacting
the Act was to raise the level of scrutiny applicable in age discrimination cases rather than to enforce the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This purpose, of course, justified a
valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power, but the rule of
Seminole Tribe prevented that provision from being used to effect
an abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Since the Act was not viewed as a valid abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment immunity enjoyed by the defendant state entities, the suits were dismissed.
Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.163 Focusing more on the rule
enunciated in Seminole Tribe than on the Flores standard, Justice Stevens insisted that “Congress’s power to authorize federal
remedies against state agencies that violate federal statutory obligations is coextensive with its power to impose those obligations
on the States in the first place.”164 In his view, Seminole Tribe
had been wrongly decided, forcing the Court to “resolve vexing
questions of constitutional law” respecting Congress’s authority
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82–83.
472 U.S. 400, 423 (1985).
507 U.S. 604, 616 (1993).
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 93.

49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC

74

12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:49

to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.165 After all, the substantive provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act had
already been upheld in EEOC v. Wyoming as a valid exercise of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.166 Had Union
Gas Co. not been overruled by Seminole Tribe, Article I would
have provided a constitutionally adequate basis for effecting the
desired abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity. He also
questioned the idea that the Judicial Branch should serve as the
guardian of state sovereignty.
In an intricate manner, Justice Stevens described the structural protections provided to the states by the Constitution. He
referred to Article I’s allocation to the states of equal representation in the Senate as the Constitution’s “principal structural protection for the sovereignty of the several States.”167 After emphasizing that point, he went on to note that “[t]he electors who
choose the President are appointed in a manner directed by the
state legislatures,” providing structural protection for the states
as they fulfill their role in selecting the only governmental figure
who can sign or veto statutes passed by Congress.168 These
structural safeguards in the Constitution, according to Justice
Stevens, made the Court’s “ancient judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity” unnecessary.169
Finally, Justice Stevens highlighted his contempt for the
holding in Seminole Tribe by declaring that the Eleventh
Amendment only placed “a textual limitation on the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.”170 In his view, the Eleventh
Amendment did not apply to federal question cases, making it
wholly inapplicable to the Kimel case. He suggested that it made
no sense to permit Congress to abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity since it was a jurisdictional limit akin to
those contained in Article III, but he nevertheless construed the
Amendment’s text to preclude its application to the case before
the Court.
Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court’s broad construction of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act in Kimel benefits most
older workers, particularly those who work for private employers.
Interpreting the Act more narrowly would likely have preserved
the abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity,
providing a more effective remedy for state workers but sacrific165
166
167
168
169
170
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ing some of the substantive protections that the Act currently
provides to non-state workers. The Court’s subsequent decision
in Smith v. City of Jackson further illustrates the breadth of the
Act’s protection by holding that the Act permits recovery under a
disparate-impact theory of liability in certain instances.171 The
Court’s recent decision in Clark v. Martinez makes it clear that
the same statute cannot be construed differently in some cases
merely because some applications raise serious constitutional
questions while others do not.172 Therefore, one could argue that
the construction of the Act in Kimel saved its effectiveness for the
overwhelming majority of older workers in the United States.
Notwithstanding this reality, however, Justice Stevens’ contention that Seminole Tribe forced the Court to reach an otherwise
inconsequential constitutional inquiry is noteworthy, especially
when coupled with his view that the Eleventh Amendment has
no application to federal question cases. What is true, in any
event, is the fact that the Flores standard, enunciated in the aftermath of Seminole Tribe, severely limited Congress’s authority
to enforce concededly valid federal legislation, as was the case
with the Act at issue in Kimel. The Act, of course, was upheld in
EEOC.173 Had the Court adopted a construction of Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment similar to that given to Section
Two of the Thirteenth Amendment in Jones and Runyon, the
plaintiffs in Kimel could have proceeded with their cases in federal court despite the holding in Seminole Tribe.
C.

United States v. Morrison

Later that year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided another
case involving Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. Unlike College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid and
Kimel, United States v. Morrison174 involved neither the Eleventh
Amendment nor a concededly valid substantive statutory
scheme. Instead, Morrison involved a constitutional challenge to
the Violence Against Women Act, which provided a federal civil
remedy to vindicate victims of gender-motivated violence.175 The
case began when a female student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute sued two members of the Institute’s football team under the
Act, accusing them of raping her. The Act defined a crime of violence “motivated by gender” as “a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in

171
172
173
174
175

125 S. Ct. 1536, 1546 (2005).
125 S. Ct. 716, 726 (2005).
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part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.”176 Federal and
state courts were given concurrent jurisdiction over complaints
brought under the Act. Congress invoked its authority under
both Article I, Section Eight and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment as its sources of constitutional power to enact the
legislation.177
The United States, in defending the constitutionality of the
Act, relied on both the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.178 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that the Act could not be sustained under either provision. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion of the
Court in Morrison, explained why the Act was in excess of Congress’s legislative authority.
The Court began its analysis of the Commerce Clause issue
by noting that the provision gives Congress the authority to
“regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.”179
Moreover, Congress possesses the power to “regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities.”180 Finally, and most relevant to
the situation in Morrison, Congress has the authority to “regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce,” or “those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”181 Having laid out the scope of federal legislative authority in this area, the Court proceeded to evaluate the
Violence Against Women Act pursuant to the standard enunciated in United States v. Lopez.182 In Lopez, the Court invalidated
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal
crime to knowingly possess a firearm within close proximity to a
school, as an excess of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate
commerce.183
The relevant inquiry considered four factors, all of which
were initially identified in Lopez. It was necessary for this detailed examination to proceed because the Violence Against
Women Act, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act invalidated in
Lopez, could not be characterized as a regulation of either the
channels or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. The
first factor discussed by the Court was the fact that “[g]ender176
177
178
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180
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42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (2000).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000); id. at 567–68.

49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC

2006]

12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM

Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power

77

motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity.”184 Second, it was noted that the Violence
Against Women Act did not contain a jurisdictional element limiting its reach to a discrete class of cases substantially related to
interstate commerce. Instead, Congress had chosen to cast the
Act’s remedy “over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of
violent crime.”185 The third Lopez factor involved an examination
into whether Congress identified specific findings to demonstrate
the regulated activity’s effect on interstate commerce. Even
though the Act was “supported by numerous findings regarding
the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims
and their families,” the Court declared that “the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.”186 Finally, the
Court viewed the link between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce as simply too attenuated to justify such an expansion of federal legislative jurisdiction under the guise of the
Commerce Clause.
Emphasizing this point, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded the Commerce Clause analysis by stating
that “if Congress may regulate gender-motivated violence, it
would be able to regulate murder or any other type of violence
since gender-motivated violence, as a subset of all violent crime,
is certain to have lesser economic impacts than the larger class of
which it is a part.”187
Since the Violence Against Women Act was not deemed to be
a valid exercise of federal legislative authority under Article I,
the Court proceeded to address the question of whether the Act
could be sustained on the alternative ground that it was a law
designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act was
passed, in large measure, to deal with the “pervasive bias in
various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated
violence.”188 The Court noted Congress’s conclusion that “discriminatory stereotypes often result in insufficient investigation
and prosecution of gender-motivated crimes, inappropriate focus
on the behavior and credibility of the victims of that crime, and
unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are actually
convicted of gender-motivated violence.”189 For these reasons, the
United States defended the Act as being necessary to remedy the
states’ biases and to deter further instances of gender-based discrimination in the state courts. It was argued that the inherent
184
185
186
187
188
189
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unfairness in the justice system itself operated as a denial of
equal protection, opening the door for federal legislation pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, the Court was unsympathetic to the arguments raised by the United States and the plaintiff. Relying on
its prior decisions in United States v. Harris190 and the Civil
Rights Cases,191 the Court declared that Enforcement Clause legislation cannot be “directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their
administration by her officers.”192 Emphasizing the point further, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the Act did nothing
to hold any Virginia public official accountable for doing an inadequate job of investigating or prosecuting the alleged assault.193 Instead, the Act was designed solely to provide a private
remedy for the victim via the use of a direct suit against her alleged attackers. Finally, the Court found the Act to be excessive
in that it applied uniformly throughout the United States and
was not limited to those states in which discrimination against
the victims of gender-motivated crimes could be identified.
Therefore, the Act was not deemed to be akin to the federal statutes upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan194 and South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.195 Those enactments, of course, were directed solely
to the particular states in which Congress found evidence of unconstitutional discrimination. For these reasons, the Violence
Against Women Act was invalidated as an excess of the powers
granted to Congress under both Article I, Section Eight and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Thomas authored a short concurring opinion in
which he expressed the view that Lopez’s “substantial effects”
test, though somewhat circumscribed, would encourage Congress
to “persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no
limits.”196 He urged the Court to replace the Lopez test with one
more consistent with the “original understanding” of the Commerce Clause.197 Justices Souter and Breyer both authored dissenting opinions.198 Justice Souter focused primarily on Congress’s findings, which included detailed evidence of the
detrimental effect that gender-motivated violence has on inter190
191
192
193
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198

106 U.S. 629 (1883).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
Id. at 626.
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Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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state commerce. He contended that “[t]he business of the courts
is to review the congressional assessment, not for soundness but
simply for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis
exists in fact.”199 Citing evidence provided by Congress indicating that violent crime against women costs the country at least
$3 billion each year, Justice Souter asserted that Congress had
good reasons to assume that the Commerce Clause gave it the
power to provide a civil remedy for the victims of gendermotivated violence.200 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer
joined his dissenting opinion.201
Justice Breyer, in a separate dissent, declared that the language in the Constitution “says nothing about either the local nature, or the economic nature, of an interstate-commerce-affecting
cause.”202 Relying on the Court’s prior decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,203 he insisted that “virtually
every kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect
commerce, or its conditions, outside the State.”204 He referred to
the structural protections for the states that were discussed in
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Kimel, explaining that the Judicial
Branch was overstepping its bounds by meticulously scrutinizing
Congress’s judgment. Justice Breyer stated that “within the
bounds of the rational, Congress, not the courts, must remain
primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal
balance.”205 Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined this
portion of Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion.206
In a later portion of his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer
stated that his conclusion that the Violence Against Women Act
was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce made it unnecessary for him to reach a conclusion with
regard to the Enforcement Clause issue.207 Nevertheless, he
questioned why the Court found Congress to lack the power to
provide a remedy for victims of gender-motivated crimes against
private actors. Even though the private actors who allegedly attacked the victim in question did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Breyer viewed the Act as an exercise of
Congress’s power to enact remedial legislation that “prohibits
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conduct which is not itself unconstitutional.”208 Since the Act did
nothing more than provide a federal remedy for victims of conduct that was already criminalized by state law, he did not agree
with the Court’s characterization of the remedy as disproportionate. He added that there was no lack of “congruence and proportionality,” for purposes of the Flores standard, because the Act
dealt with nothing other than “the creation of a federal remedy to
substitute for constitutionally inadequate state remedies.”209 Justice Stevens joined this portion of Justice Breyer’s dissenting
opinion, which consisted of skeptical observations about the
Court’s Enforcement Clause analysis without purporting to give
a firm answer to the question presented.
The holding in Morrison regarding the Fourteenth Amendment issue was consistent with the Court’s prior decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,210
which made it clear that the Constitution does not impose an affirmative duty on the states to protect individuals from violent
criminals. This principle was further illustrated by the Court’s
recent decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales.211 Justice
Scalia, who delivered the opinion of the Court in Gonzales, explained that “the benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger
protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its ‘substantive’ manifestations.”212 Nevertheless,
Congress’s judgment that victims of gender-motivated violence
were being effectively denied the equal protection of the laws was
entitled to more deference than that shown by the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Violence Against Women Act was designed to counter
the apparent inadequacies found in the justice systems of the
several states. Such inadequacies, in many instances, could lead
to violations of the Equal Protection Clause. While it is true that
the Act was directed at private conduct rather than state action,
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment delegates the enforcement power to Congress. Congress believed that the Act
was “appropriate legislation”213 to deal with the problem of de
facto gender discrimination in the criminal justice system, and
the means chosen to address the perceived constitutional deficiencies should have been accorded the respect owed to the people’s elected representatives. The Court again made no attempt
to distinguish the narrow construction given to Section Five of
208
209
210
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213
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the Fourteenth Amendment in Morrison from the broad construction given to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment in
Jones and Runyon. While it is true that the Thirteenth Amendment itself applies to private conduct, it is also true that the
sweeping legislative enactments upheld in those two cases went
far beyond the prohibitions contained in the underlying constitutional provision. The Court has not explained why the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be read more
narrowly than its almost identical counterpart.
D. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett
The following year, the Court decided another case involving
the interaction between the standards enunciated in Seminole
Tribe and Flores. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama
v. Garrett214 posed the question of whether Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990215 constituted a valid abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Act’s
substantive provisions were not challenged as an excess of Congress’s legislative authority under Article I, but the holding in
Seminole Tribe prevented the concededly valid statutory requirements from justifying an abrogation of the states’ sovereign
immunity. Therefore, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that the Act was a valid exercise of Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment before they could pursue their case.
Like the plaintiffs in College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid and
Kimel, they were unsuccessful.216
The Act prohibits covered employers, including the states,
from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”217 To facilitate
the Act’s objectives, employers covered by its provisions are required to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the
employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [employer’s]
business.”218 Congress clearly expressed its intent to subject the
states to suits brought by private individuals for violations of the
214
215
216
217
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531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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Act, making it unnecessary for the Court to engage in an extensive analysis of how to interpret the statute.219
The Court began the inquiry required under Flores by looking to its prior decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.220 made it clear that “States are not required by
the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for
the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are
rational.”221 The Court explained that classifications based on
disability, like the age classifications discussed in Kimel, “cannot
run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”222 Therefore, it was apparent to
the Court that the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act extended far beyond the mandates of the Equal Protection Clause. After all, not all violations of the Act resulted from
irrational discrimination, given that an employer may reasonably
conclude that it is less costly to hire healthy employees than it is
to make special accommodations for disabled workers.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the Court’s opinion
in Garrett, went on to “examine whether Congress identified a
history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against the disabled.”223 Examples of discrimination by local governments were deemed irrelevant to the
inquiry. Even though the actions of local governments constitute
state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court’s determination in Lincoln County v. Luning224 that local
governments do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity precluded congressional reliance on misconduct by local governmental entities for purposes of establishing the needed pattern of
state misconduct.225
Although the record provided evidence of unwillingness on
the part of some state officials to make the sort of accommodations for the disabled required by the Act, the Equal Protection
Clause did not mandate such accommodations. The Act did contain an exception for employers able to demonstrate that the accommodation requirement would impose an “undue hardship on
the operation of the business”226 involved. The Court insisted
219
220
221
222
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that the accommodation duty imposed by the Act still far exceeded the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it
made unlawful “a range of alternate responses that would be
reasonable but would fall short of imposing an ‘undue burden’
upon the employer.”227 It was also noted that the Act placed the
burden on the employer to prove that it would suffer such a
hardship, while the complaining party had to “negate reasonable
bases for the employer’s decision” to establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.228 Finally, the Court found the Act’s
prohibition against the use of “standards, criteria, or methods of
administration” that had a disparate impact on the disabled to be
out of proportion with the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.
In Washington v. Davis, the Court had found evidence of a disparate impact on racial minorities, standing alone, to be insufficient
to establish a violation of the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.229
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded the opinion of the Court
by contrasting the Americans with Disabilities Act with the Voting Rights Act upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.230 After
stating that “Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is virtually
identical to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,”231 he described
the Voting Rights Act as “a detailed but limited remedial scheme
designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the Fifteenth
Amendment in those areas of the Nation where abundant evidence of States’ systematic denial of those rights was identified.”232 He declared that “in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a
pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must
be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.”233 Consequently, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act was
found to be in excess of Congress’s power to enforce the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a footnote, the
Court noted that Title I’s provisions still applied to the states and
could be “enforced by the United States in actions for money
damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.”234
Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion, joined by
227
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Justice O’Connor.235 He expressed his agreement with the Court
by declaring that “[t]he predicate for money damages against an
unconsenting State in suits brought by private persons must be a
federal statute enacted upon the documentation of patterns of
constitutional violations committed by the State in its official capacity.”236 Since no pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by
the states had been identified, Justice Kennedy believed that the
Act was in excess of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Garrett was a five to four decision, with Justice Breyer authoring a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter
and Ginsburg.237 Justice Breyer insisted that the Court had not
“traditionally required Congress to make findings as to state discrimination, or to break down the record evidence, category by
category.”238 As he saw it, the inquiry in cases like Katzenbach v.
Morgan239 had been “whether Congress’s likely conclusions were
reasonable.”240 He saw no need for the Court to focus on whether
there was “adequate evidentiary support in the record.”241 Lamenting the lack of deference shown to the Legislative Branch,
he noted that “[t]he Court’s failure to find sufficient evidentiary
support may well rest upon its decision to hold Congress to a
strict, judicially created evidentiary standard, particularly in respect to lack of justification.”242
Justice Breyer went on to decry the Court’s misapprehension
of its role in the case. He stated that “neither the ‘burden of
proof’ that favors States nor any other rule of restraint applicable
to judges applies to Congress when it exercises its § 5 power.”243
He contended that “Congress directly reflects public attitudes
and beliefs, enabling Congress better to understand where, and
to what extent, refusals to accommodate a disability amount to
behavior that is callous or unreasonable to the point of lacking
constitutional justification.”244 Although he acknowledged that
“what is ‘reasonable’ in the statutory sense and what is ‘unreasonable’ in the constitutional sense might differ,”245 Justice
Breyer emphasized that the framers of the Enforcement Clause
“sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245

Id. at 374 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 376.
Id. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 380.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 385.

49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC

2006]

12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM

Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power

85

the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in
the Necessary and Proper Clause.”246 Quoting South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, which involved the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment, he declared that Congress had the prerogative to use “any rational means to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition.”247 It was clear to Justice Breyer that the Americans
with Disabilities Act was unquestionably a valid exercise of Congress’s authority to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, he would have upheld Congress’s purported abrogation of
the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Garrett serves as further evidence of the lack of deference shown to Congress in recent years. Garrett also contained another flaw. The Court’s
language about the pattern requirement was so unclear that it
has led some to conclude that such documentation is required
whenever Congress chooses to abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity.248 Such an interpretation of the Court’s
opinion would explain why the Court discounted examples of discrimination by local governments. Nevertheless, this interpretation makes no sense when taking into consideration the context
of the Court’s language. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the
Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which prohibited a
broader swath of conduct than that directly forbidden by the Fifteenth Amendment.249 The Act’s substantive provisions were
deemed valid enforcement measures because the prohibited state
conduct, though not itself unconstitutional, had resulted in constitutional violations in various instances. Consequently, it
would seem that the documentation of a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the states is required when Congress enacts
prophylactic legislation that raises the substantive bar above the
constitutional mandate. Congress need not, however, provide
such documentation when it merely provides a remedy for actual
violations of the Constitution. This line of reasoning leads to the
conclusion that Congress is always free to abrogate the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity, even without a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the states, as long as the substantive
requirements of the underlying statute do not prohibit conduct
that is not proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
The Court’s opinion in Garrett, however, was very unclear.
Id. at 386 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966)).
Id. at 386 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)).
Joan Shinavski, The Eleventh Amendment Bars Private Individuals from Suing
State Employers for Money Damages Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilites Act:
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 40 DUQUESNE LAW REVIEW
161–179 (2001).
249 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337.
246
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Since local governments are state actors for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was no reason for the Court to ignore
evidence of discrimination by local governments. While it is true
that local governments do not enjoy the immunity that the Eleventh Amendment gives to the states, the pattern of discrimination documented by Congress does not belong in the abrogation
calculus. Instead, it is relevant only for demonstrating that the
substantive requirements of the underlying prophylactic Act are
necessary in order to prevent actual constitutional violations. As
Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissenting opinion, “the substantive obligation that the Equal Protection Clause creates applies to state and local governmental entities alike.”250 The same
is true of the substantive obligations that the Americans with
Disabilities Act imposes on government employers. Since evidence of past discrimination by governmental entities was only
relevant for establishing that the Act’s prophylactic requirements
were needed to deter actual violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court was wrong to discount examples of discrimination by local governments.
The Court’s reliance on South Carolina v. Katzenbach was
anomalous for yet another reason. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the precedent was relevant because of the similarities in the wording of Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.251 Nonetheless,
he never mentioned that the two constitutional provisions,
though similar to each other, are almost identical to Section Two
of the Thirteenth Amendment as well. The legislative enactments upheld in Jones and Runyon pursuant to Section Two of
the Thirteenth Amendment were certainly not “congruent” and
“proportional” for purposes of Flores. Those statutes swept far
beyond the narrow requirements of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Court construed Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment very broadly in Jones and Runyon, and it has not
provided a principled reason for giving an overly narrow construction to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in Flores,
College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison and
Garrett.
III. THE COURT’S RETREAT IN HIBBS, LANE AND GOODMAN
A.

Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs

After Garrett was decided, it appeared as if the rigorous judicial scrutiny applied to Enforcement Clause legislation would
250
251
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continue to disrupt the enforcement of many other federal laws.
The Americans with Disabilities Act, signed into law by President George H.W. Bush in 1990, was the sixth Act that the U.S.
Supreme Court had found to be in excess of Congress’s power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Flores, College Savings
Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison and Garrett were all decided within a five-year span. For proponents of prophylactic legislation, no end to the judicial overreaching seemed to be in sight.
Nevertheless, that changed in 2003, when the Court issued its
decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.252
In Hibbs, the Court determined that the Family and Medical
Leave Act was a legitimate exercise of Congress’s Enforcement
Clause authority.253
The Family and Medical Leave Act, which was signed into
law by President Bill Clinton in 1993, entitles eligible employees
to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave annually for any of a
variety of reasons.254 Aggrieved employees may seek both equitable relief and money damages against offending employers covered under the statute, including state employers. An employee
of the State of Nevada sued his employer in federal court for an
alleged violation of the Act, seeking money damages in addition
to injunctive and declaratory relief. The Nevada Department of
Human Resources contended that the Eleventh Amendment
barred the suit because the Act, though a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I power, was in excess of its authority to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment. Like the state defendants in College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel and Garrett, the Department believed that the rules of Seminole Tribe and Flores entitled it to the dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit. Notwithstanding
some apparent similarities, however, the Court’s ruling in Hibbs
went the other way.
In enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act, Congress relied on both the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe, of course, prevented the
plaintiff from relying on the Commerce Clause to sustain the
Act’s purported abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity, so the inquiry quickly turned to the question of
whether the Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s Enforcement
Clause power. Among the purposes listed in the Act was the
promotion of “equal employment opportunity for women and
men” in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.255
252
253
254
255

538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003).
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5) (2000).
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Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Act was
a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, thereby enabling the plaintiff to proceed with his
suit in federal court pursuant to the rule of Fitzpatrick.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion of the
Court in Hibbs, noted at the outset that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment enables Congress to “enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct,
in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.”256 Explaining that the Act aimed “to protect the right to be free from
gender-based discrimination in the workplace,”257 he went on to
say that heightened scrutiny applied to gender-based discrimination challenged on Equal Protection Clause grounds. In order for
a gender-based classification to withstand such scrutiny in court,
it must “serv[e] important governmental objectives,” and “the discriminatory means employed [must be] substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives.”258 The Constitution does
not permit the states to “rely on overbroad generalizations about
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”259 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that Congress had
documented evidence of gender discrimination in the familyleave context. He pointed out that many states had provided
women with maternity leave that exceeded the “period of physical disability due to pregnancy and childbirth” without offering a
similar benefit to fathers.260 He declared that these “differential
leave policies were not attributable to any differential physical
needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role
stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work.”261
The Court went on to assert that the discretionary nature of
some family-leave programs had resulted in de facto gender discrimination, providing a reasonable basis for Congress to conclude that “such discretionary family-leave programs would do
little to combat the stereotypes about the roles of male and female employees.”262 There had also been instances of overt discrimination, as “seven States had childcare leave provisions that
applied to women only” and “Massachusetts required that notice
of its leave provisions be posted only in ‘establishments in which
females are employed.’”263 These cases of gender-based discrimi256
257
258
259
260
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Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727–28.
Id. at 728.
Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
Id. at 729 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533).
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 733 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105D (West 2004)).
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nation convinced the Court that Congress was justified in relying
on its Enforcement Clause power to pass the Family and Medical
Leave Act, which provided men and women with an equal statutory right to unpaid leave. The Court distinguished Kimel and
Garrett by emphasizing the difference between the rational basis
test that applies to age and disability classifications and the
heightened scrutiny that applies to gender classifications.264
Since the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of
gender-based classifications is more difficult for the states to
meet than the rationality standard applicable to classifications
based on age and disability, it was easier for Congress to establish a pattern of unconstitutional gender discrimination by the
states.
It was also determined that the Family and Medical Leave
Act was “congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.”265
The Court reasoned that Congress had the authority to create
“an across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all eligible
employees” in order to “ensure that family-care leave would no
longer be stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace
caused by female employees, and that employers could not evade
leave obligations simply by hiring men.”266 Therefore, the Act
was deemed a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause, permitting the plaintiff in Hibbs to proceed with his suit against the State of Nevada. Since the underlying federal Act passed the “congruence and proportionality”
test enunciated in Flores, the case was governed by Fitzpatrick,
and the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude federal adjudicatory jurisdiction.
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, was joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg
and Breyer. In a short concurring opinion, Justice Souter noted
that he joined the opinion of the Court without abandoning the
dissenting positions expressed in Seminole Tribe, Florida Prepaid, Kimel and Garrett.267 He was joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer. Justice Stevens, who concurred in the judgment, did
not join the opinion of the Court because he was uncertain
whether the Family and Medical Leave Act was “truly ‘needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’” and had
“never been convinced that an Act of Congress can amend the

264
265

Id. at 735.
Id. at 737 (quoting Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374
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Id.
Id. at 740 (Souter, J., concurring).

(2001)).
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Constitution.”268 He concurred in the judgment only because he
viewed Nevada’s sovereign immunity defense as one based on
judge-made common law, which Congress could abrogate pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority. He insisted that the Eleventh Amendment posed no barrier to the adjudication at issue in
Hibbs because the plaintiff was a citizen of Nevada. The Eleventh Amendment, of course, only states: “The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”269 Justice Stevens construed the
Eleventh Amendment to be nothing more than a limit on the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in which he decried the nationwide reach of the remedy. He declared that the
inquiry should focus on “whether the State has itself engaged in
discrimination sufficient to support the exercise of Congress’s
prophylactic power.”270 In his view, Congress was only empowered to apply prophylactic legislation to those particular states
that had engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Therefore, he
would have dismissed the plaintiff’s suit in the absence of a congressional determination that Nevada, as opposed to some states,
had engaged in unconstitutional gender discrimination in the
area of family and medical leave.271
Justice Kennedy authored a separate dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. He asserted that Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress the
power to create an “entitlement program of its own design.”272
While expressing the view that “[t]he Commerce Clause likely
would permit the National Government to enact an entitlement
program” such as the one created by the Family and Medical
Leave Act, he insisted that the Act could not be sustained as a
valid exercise of Congress’s Enforcement Clause authority.273 It
was clear that he did not view the stereotypes described by the
Court as evidence of unconstitutional discrimination by the
states. Justice Kennedy declared:
Given the insufficiency of the evidence that States discriminated in
the provision of family leave, the unfortunate fact that stereotypes
about women continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem

268
269
270
271
272
273

Id. at 740–41 (Stevens, J., concurring).
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 744 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
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would not alone support the charge that a State has engaged in a
practice designed to deny its citizens the equal protection of the
laws.274

He contended that the states’ sovereign immunity “cannot be
abrogated without documentation of a pattern of unconstitutional acts by the States, and only then by a congruent and
proportional remedy.”275
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Hibbs, like the opinion of the Court in Garrett, did not clarify when the documentation requirement applies. Although his language implies that
Congress cannot abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in any instance without documenting a pattern of unconstitutional activity, the context of that language indicates that
the documentation requirement applies only when the underlying federal statute imposes a higher standard on the states than
that set by the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The Family and
Medical Leave Act undoubtedly does that. Justice Kennedy did
not address a situation in which Congress, seeking to deter violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, acts to abrogate the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity in cases where the plaintiffs’
complaints allege unconstitutional conduct rather than conduct
that merely violates a federal prophylactic statute. If Congress
were to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in
cases involving suits against the states for actual violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is unlikely that the documentation requirement would apply. It would make no sense for the
Court to say that Congress must wait for a pattern of unconstitutional activity to develop before allowing private lawsuits to redress the relevant violations. The documentation requirement,
therefore, appears to be applicable only when Congress attempts
to demonstrate that prophylactic legislation, which raises the bar
above the requirements of the Constitution, is needed to deter actual violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The alternative
understanding would be even more troubling than the status
quo, as it would be utterly ridiculous to require that Congress allow some unconstitutional conduct to go unaddressed before
permitting aggrieved individuals to sue their respective states.
In any event, the Court clearly appears to be showing more
deference to Congress’s judgment when the challenged prophylactic legislation is designed to deter discrimination based on
race or gender. Hibbs was an important victory for equality in
the workplace, and it remains to be seen whether the principles
274
275

Id. at 754.
Id. at 759.
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underlying that decision will be sufficient to sustain other prophylactic statutes. While it is unfortunate that a similar respect
for legislative judgment was not shown in Morrison, it is generally true that the Violence Against Women Act was directed at
private conduct rather than state action. For this reason, the
constitutional prospects for prophylactic legislation designed to
combat state-sanctioned gender discrimination appear to be good.
B.

Tennessee v. Lane

A year after the Hibbs decision, the U.S. Supreme Court was
called upon to decide whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act constituted a valid exercise of Congress’s power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.276 Title II provides that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”277 In Tennessee
v. Lane, the Court found Title II to be a valid exercise of Congress’s prophylactic power as applied to “the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.”278
Two paraplegics sued the State of Tennessee and several
Tennessee counties, alleging that they had been denied access to
the state judicial system due to their disabilities. George Lane
alleged that he was required to appear on the second floor of a
courthouse that lacked an elevator in order to answer a set of
criminal charges.279 Apparently, he got to the courtroom only after crawling up two flights of stairs. When he returned to the
courthouse for another hearing, he was arrested and jailed for
failure to appear after refusing to crawl again or to be carried to
the courtroom by police officers.280 Beverly Jones, who was a certified court reporter, claimed that she was denied both work opportunities and chances to participate in the judicial process because of inadequate accommodations at various county
courthouses.281 The State of Tennessee contended that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit, relying heavily on the Court’s
prior decision in Garrett.
Justice Stevens, who delivered the opinion of the Court in
Lane, explained that the Court’s opinion in Garrett had noted
that most of the instances of state-sponsored discrimination
276
277
278
279
280
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Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1982 (2004).
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994.
Id. at 1982.
Id. at 1983.
Id.
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against the disabled documented by Congress “related to ‘the
provision of public services and public accommodations, which
areas are addressed in Titles II and III,’ rather than Title I.”282
That was among the reasons why Garrett held that “Title I’s
broad remedial scheme was insufficiently targeted to remedy or
prevent unconstitutional discrimination in public employment.”283 Nevertheless, because of the differences between the
substantive provisions of Titles I and II, Garrett left open the
possibility that Title II was a valid exercise of Congress’s power
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court likewise emphasized that Title II was enacted to
enforce constitutional guarantees other than the Equal Protection Clause. Although governmental discrimination against the
disabled only triggers a rationality analysis for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court declared that Title II sought
to “enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial review.”284 For instance, the Due Process Clause guarantees to a
criminal defendant the “right to be present at all stages of the
trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.”285 That right is also secured by the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which is incorporated within the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due
Process Clause also requires the states to provide certain civil
litigants with a “‘meaningful opportunity to be heard’ by removing obstacles to their full participation in judicial proceedings.”286
The Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, applicable to the
states by virtue of the Due Process Clause, guarantees to criminal defendants the right to “trial by a jury composed of a fair
cross section of the community.”287 Disabled persons are, of
course, a part of that community. The First Amendment, which
is also incorporated within the Due Process Clause, secures to
members of the public “a right of access to criminal proceedings.”288 Consequently, the rationale that controlled in Garrett
was inapplicable in Lane.
Proceeding to the documentation analysis, the Court noted
that “[a] report before Congress showed that some 76% of public
services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by persons with disabilities, even tak282
283
284
285
286
287
288

Id. at 1987 (quoting Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 n.7).
Id. (summarizing the holding in Garrett).
Id. at 1988.
Id. (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)).
Id. (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
Id.
Id.
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ing into account the possibility that the services and programs
might be restructured or relocated to other parts of the buildings.”289 The Court stated:
[Congress’s] appointed task force heard numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with disabilities from state judicial services and
programs, including exclusion of persons with visual impairments and
hearing impairments from jury service, failure of state and local governments to provide interpretive services for the hearing impaired,
failure to permit the testimony of adults with developmental disabilities in abuse cases, and failure to make courtrooms accessible to witnesses with physical disabilities.290

These findings were clearly sufficient to satisfy the need for evidence of unconstitutional discrimination by the states.
Comparing the circumstances in Lane to those that had been
present in Hibbs, the Court asserted that Title II was aimed at
the enforcement of a variety of constitutional rights “that call for
a standard of judicial review at least as searching, and in some
cases more searching, than the standard that applies to sexbased classifications.”291 The Court also made it clear that it did
not have to “consider Title II, with its wide variety of applications, as an undifferentiated whole.”292 Instead, the inquiry was
limited to the question of whether the Enforcement Clause provided Congress with the authority to subject unconsenting states
to suits for money damages for failing to give the disabled access
to the courts. Since the Court found Title II to be valid Enforcement Clause legislation as applied to “the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services,” other applications of the
statute were deemed immaterial to the outcome of the case.293 It
was likewise noted that Garrett, which had severed Title I from
Title II for purposes of the Enforcement Clause inquiry, demonstrated that courts were not required to “examine the full
breadth of the statute all at once.”294
Title II was viewed as “congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts” because it “require[d] only ‘reasonable modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided, and only when
the individual seeking modification [was] otherwise eligible for
the service.”295 Since the case at issue in Lane implicated additional constitutional rights secured by the Fourteenth Amend289
290
291
292
293
294
295

Id. at 1990–91.
Id. at 1991.
Id. at 1992.
Id.
Id. at 1993.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000)).
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ment, the Court saw no need to decide whether Title II’s duty to
accommodate was in excess of Congress’s Section Five authority
as applied to the class of cases implicating only the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of irrational discrimination against disabled persons.296 Congress clearly stated its intention to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted
the Americans with Disabilities Act.297 Therefore, pursuant to
the Court’s prior decisions in Fitzpatrick and Hibbs, the plaintiffs
in Lane were able to proceed with their Title II actions in federal
court.
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Stevens, was
joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. In a
concurring opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter decried the Court’s prior decision in Buck v. Bell,298 which sustained
the constitutionality of the “once-pervasive practice of involuntarily sterilizing those with mental disabilities.”299 He declared that
“the judiciary itself has endorsed the basis for some of the very
discrimination subject to congressional remedy under § 5.”300
Justice Ginsburg, who was joined by Justices Souter and Breyer,
authored a concurring opinion in which she insisted that it was
“not conducive to a harmonious federal system to require Congress, before it exercises authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, essentially to indict each State for disregarding the
equal-citizenship stature of persons with disabilities.”301 She
went on to state that there was no need to “disarm a National
Legislature for resisting an adversarial approach to lawmaking
better suited to the courtroom.”302 Justice Ginsburg concluded
her concurrence by expressing her approval of the Court’s decision to defer to Congress’s judgment in cases implicating the
right of access to judicial proceedings.
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. In his view, the Court’s
decision in Lane could not be reconciled with Garrett. Relying on
Garrett, he stated that the first step of Flores’ “congruence and
proportionality” analysis was to “identify with some precision the
scope of the constitutional right at issue.”303 The second step, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, was to “examine whether
Id. at 1994 n.20.
42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000).
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1995 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1996 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 1997.
Id. at 1998 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001)).
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
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Congress identified a history and pattern of violations” of the
constitutional right being enforced.304 Finally, he contended that
the last step of the Flores inquiry required the Court to determine “whether the rights and remedies created by Title II [were]
congruent and proportional to the constitutional rights it purport[ed] to enforce and the record of constitutional violations adduced by Congress.”305 Chief Justice Rehnquist was clearly convinced that Garrett required the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suits
against the State of Tennessee.
Beginning with the first step of the analysis, Chief Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged that “the task of identifying the scope of
the relevant constitutional protection” in Lane was difficult because Title II purported to “enforce a panoply of constitutional
rights of disabled persons.”306 Since the Court upheld Title II as
applied to “the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of
access to the courts,” he viewed the proper inquiry as being limited to the scope of those due process rights specifically related to
access to judicial proceedings.307 Moving on to the second step,
he criticized the majority for setting out on “a wide-ranging account of societal discrimination against the disabled” instead of
limiting its examination of constitutional violations to the specific due process right on which it relied to uphold Title II.308 He
indicated that such a broad examination of the documentation
was especially inappropriate in light of the Court’s decision to
evaluate Title II only as applied to the circumstances in Lane.
Expressing doubt that the statute was designed to deter actual
constitutional violations, he declared that no person “has a constitutional right to make his way into a courtroom without any
external assistance” and that “[a] violation of due process occurs
only when a person is actually denied the constitutional right to
access a given judicial proceeding.”309
Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to the third step of the Flores analysis and insisted that Title II was out of proportion with
Congress’s objective of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive provisions. He stated that the Court was obligated
to measure the full breadth of Title II’s coverage against the
scope of the specific constitutional rights that it purported to enforce. In his view, the Court’s “as applied” approach was inappropriate in the Enforcement Clause context because it converted

304
305
306
307
308
309

Id. at 1999 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2003.
Id. at 1998.
Id.
Id. at 1999.
Id. at 2002.
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the Flores inquiry into a test of whether the Court could “conceive of a hypothetical statute narrowly tailored enough to constitute valid prophylactic legislation.”310 He contended that the
majority’s analysis would allow Congress to “simply rely on the
courts to sort out which hypothetical applications of an undifferentiated statute, such as Title II, may be enforced against the
States.”311 This, he said, would eliminate any incentive for Congress to draft Enforcement Clause legislation narrowly “for the
purpose of remedying or deterring actual constitutional violations.”312
Justice Scalia also authored a dissenting opinion.313 He
abandoned his support for Flores’ “congruence and proportionality” standard, calling it “a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.”314 Instead, he proposed a test even more restrictive of Congress’s authority to
enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. He asserted that “[n]othing in § 5 allows Congress to go
beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe,
prevent, or ‘remedy’ conduct that does not itself violate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.”315 In his view, Section Five
only “authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through
which the citizen may vindicate his [or her] Fourteenth Amendment rights.”316 Addressing the principle of stare decisis, he
noted that most of the pre-Hibbs decisions sustaining prophylactic legislation under the Civil War Amendments had “involved
congressional measures that were directed exclusively against, or
were used in the particular case to remedy, racial discrimination.”317 Jones was among the cases cited by Justice Scalia to illustrate this point. He contended that when many of those earlier cases were decided, “the Fourteenth Amendment did not
include the many guarantees that it now provides,” creating a
situation in which “it did not appear to be a massive expansion of
congressional power to interpret § 5 broadly.”318
Consequently, Justice Scalia declared that he would only apply a permissive Enforcement Clause standard to “congressional
measures designed to remedy racial discrimination by the

310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
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Id. at 2005.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2007 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2008–09.
Id. at 2009.
Id. at 2009–10.
Id. at 2010.
Id. at 2011–12.
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States.”319 Referring to his prior dissent in Hibbs, he made it
clear that he was not abandoning “the requirement that Congress may impose prophylactic § 5 legislation only upon those
particular States in which there has been an identified history of
relevant constitutional violations.”320 Citing Morrison, he stated
his intention to “adhere to the requirement that the prophylactic
remedy predicated upon such state violations must be directed
against the States or state actors rather than the public at
large.”321 Assuming that those requirements were met and that
no other constitutional provision was violated, Justice Scalia asserted that he would “leave it to Congress, under constraints no
tighter than those of the Necessary and Proper Clause, to decide
what measures are appropriate under § 5 to prevent or remedy
racial discrimination by the States.”322 Nonetheless, he emphasized that he would not show Congress such extensive deference
in other Enforcement Clause contexts and that it was “past time
to draw a line limiting the uncontrolled spread of a wellintentioned textual distortion.”323 Justice Thomas, who joined
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent but not that of Justice Scalia,
authored a short dissenting opinion in which he expressed the
view that Hibbs had been wrongly decided and made it clear that
he was not relying on that precedent to reach his conclusion in
Lane.324
C.

United States v. Georgia

In 2006, the Court decided its first case involving the Enforcement Clause under newly confirmed Chief Justice John G.
Roberts, Jr., who was chosen by President George W. Bush to replace Chief Justice Rehnquist. Surprisingly, United States v.
Georgia (hereinafter referred to as “Goodman”) was a unanimous
decision.325 Justice Scalia, who delivered the opinion of the
Court, explained that the question for consideration was
“whether a disabled inmate in a state prison may sue the State
for money damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”326 Title II states that “no qualified individual . . . shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from parId. at 2012.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2013.
Id.
Id. at 2013 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006). Tony Goodman was
the petitioner in No. 04-1236. The United States, the petitioner in No. 04-1203, “intervened to defend the constitutionality of Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”
Id. at 880.
326 Id. at 878; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2000).
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
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ticipation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity.”327 Relying on the Court’s prior decision in
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,328 Justice
Scalia noted that it was clear that the term “public entity” was
broad enough to include state prisons.329 Congress’s intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity was, of course,
clearly expressed in the Act.330
Tony Goodman, a paraplegic inmate in a Georgia prison,
sued the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections, in addition to several individual prison officials, under both
Title II and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.331 He sought “both injunctive relief
and money damages against all defendants.”332 He alleged that
“he had injured himself in attempting to transfer from his wheelchair to the shower or toilet on his own and [that], on several
other occasions, he had been forced to sit in his own feces and
urine while prison officials refused to assist him in cleaning up
the waste.”333 In addition, Goodman claimed that he had been
denied access to physical therapy, medical treatment and other
services on account of his disability.
It was noted at the outset that “Goodman’s claims for money
damages against the State under Title II were evidently based, at
least in large part, on conduct that independently violated the
provisions of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”334 This was due
to the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual
punishment, which was incorporated within the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.335 Georgia did not dispute
Goodman’s assertion that the same alleged conduct that violated
the Eighth Amendment also violated Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.336
Writing for the Court in Goodman and relying on his own
prior dissent in Lane, Justice Scalia explained that no member of
the Court doubted Congress’s Section Five authority to create
“private remedies against the States for actual violations” of the
Fourteenth Amendment.337 The Court went on to state that, “in327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
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337

42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998).
Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 879.
42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165, 1983.
Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 879.
Id.
Id. at 881.
Louisiana ex. rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).
Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 881–82.
Id. at 881.
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sofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages
against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity.”338 Consequently, it was determined that the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had “erred in dismissing those of Goodman’s Title II claims that were based on such
unconstitutional conduct.”339 The Supreme Court declined to address the question of whether Congress’s purported abrogation of
sovereign immunity was valid as to the class of alleged conduct
that “violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,” leaving it to the applicable inferior federal courts to conduct the “congruence and proportionality” inquiry in the first instance.340
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Ginsburg, emphasized that the Court’s focus on Goodman’s
Eighth Amendment claims arose “simply from the fact that those
[were] the only constitutional violations [that] the Eleventh Circuit [had] found him to have alleged properly.”341 He asserted
that “the history of mistreatment leading to Congress’ decision to
extend Title II’s protections to prison inmates was not limited to
violations of the Eighth Amendment,”342 and that courts had “reviewed myriad other types of claims by disabled prisoners, such
as allegations of the abridgment of religious liberties, undue censorship, interference with access to the judicial process, and procedural due process violations.”343 Justice Stevens concluded his
concurring opinion by explaining that the District Court and the
Court of Appeals would, on remand, have an opportunity to consider all of the potential Fourteenth Amendment violations for
purposes of both Goodman’s complaint and the Flores inquiry.344
Goodman cleared up much of the confusion created by the
Court’s poorly written opinion in Garrett. First of all, it now
seems obvious that the documentation requirement applies only
when Congress prohibits conduct which does not itself violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that Congress clearly has the
power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in
order to redress Fourteenth Amendment violations. Secondly, in
light of Lane and Goodman, litigants who allege conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment are likely to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment hurdle, assuming that Congress’s
338
339
340
341
342
343
344

Id. at 882.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 883 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 884.
Id.
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intent to abrogate sovereign immunity is clear, even if the underlying statutes do not satisfy the “congruence and proportionality”
standard as applied to the broader class of cases which do not involve constitutional violations.
These principles are consistent with Justice Scalia’s dissent
in Lane, in which he conceded that Congress has the power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to redress actual Fourteenth Amendment violations. It is worthy of
note that Justice Scalia did not join Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
dissenting opinion in Lane, where the Chief Justice contended
that the Court’s “as applied” approach to the case was erroneous.
The Chief Justice found that it would permit Congress to “simply
rely on the courts to sort out which hypothetical applications of
an undifferentiated statute, such as Title II, may be enforced
against the States.”345 Justice Scalia authored his own dissent in
Lane, expressing the view that Congress’s ability to prohibit
more than the Fourteenth Amendment itself prohibits should be
limited to cases involving racial discrimination.
While it is true that most of the Court’s early decisions upholding sweeping Enforcement Clause legislation involved congressional efforts to deter racial discrimination, Justice Scalia
provided no principled reason for subjecting prophylactic legislation involving other Fourteenth Amendment rights to a greater
degree of judicial scrutiny. When viewed in the context of Jones
and Runyon, the “congruence and proportionality” standard
enunciated in Flores is virtually inexplicable. Therefore, neither
the restrictive test advocated by Justice Scalia, nor the slightly
less rigorous test currently used by the Court to assess the constitutionality of Enforcement Clause legislation, is consistent
with the Court’s pre-Flores precedents.
In Jones, the Court sustained a broad civil rights statute under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment on the ground
that “the Enabling Clause of that Amendment empowered Congress to do much more” than the self-executing Section One accomplished in the absence of additional federal legislation.346 In
Runyon, the Court reaffirmed Congress’s authority to enact such
legislation.347 There was no indication that Section Two legislation had to be limited to the purpose of remedying or deterring
actual Thirteenth Amendment violations.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court declared that “the
McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what consti345
346
347

Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976).
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tutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”348 McCulloch construed the Necessary and Proper
Clause as an extensive grant of legislative authority and rejected
an argument for a narrow reading of that provision.349 Likening
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Necessary and Proper Clause as construed in McCulloch, the
Court explained in Morgan that “§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”350 The construction
given to the Enforcement Clause was clearly one that showed a
substantial degree of deference to the judgments made by Congress.
The Court likewise adopted a broad construction of Section
Two of the Fifteenth Amendment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. In that case, the Court stated that “[t]he basic test to be
applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the
same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress
with relation to the reserved powers of the States.”351 This was,
of course, a direct reference to Chief Justice Marshall’s language
in McCulloch. It was further noted that the Court had “echoed
his language in describing each of the Civil War Amendments.”352
Unfortunately, the Court has not seen fit to echo the language of Chief Justice Marshall in recent times, particularly with
regard to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The utter
lack of deference shown to Congress in Flores, College Savings
Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison and Garrett is a far cry
from the rationale underlying the Court’s decision in McCulloch.
Furthermore, the Court has made no attempt to distinguish its
recent Enforcement Clause holdings from Jones and Runyon.
Since the Thirteenth Amendment itself restricts private entities,
it is easy to understand why Jones and Runyon did not call for a
different result in Morrison. The Fourteenth Amendment, of
course, only limits state action, providing the Court with a logical
reason to view the Violence Against Women Act as an excess of
Congress’s Enforcement Clause authority. That Act was concededly directed against private actors. This is true despite the fact
that it was designed, at least in part, to address the problem of
gender discrimination in the criminal justice system. That is not
to say that Morrison was correctly decided, but it does illustrate
348
349
350
351
352

384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323–25 (1819).
384 U.S. at 651.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966).
Id. at 327.
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why the Court’s Thirteenth Amendment precedents were never
used to inform the Court’s Enforcement Clause inquiry. Nevertheless, that line of reasoning was wholly inapplicable in Flores,
College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel and Garrett.
In Garrett, the Court noted that “Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment is virtually identical to § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”353 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the
opinion of the Court in Garrett, described Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act as an excess of Congress’s power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment. He viewed the Voting Rights Act
upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach as a “limited remedial
scheme designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment.”354 Contending that Title I was not a “limited remedial scheme” akin to the Voting Rights Act, he purported to rely on South Carolina v. Katzenbach to justify the
invalidation of Title I for Enforcement Clause purposes.355 That
precedent, however, exhibited a large measure of deference to
Congress, making the Court’s reliance on it in Garrett all the
more ironic.
Since the Court relied on a precedent involving the Fifteenth
Amendment to justify a narrow construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Enforcement Clause, there is no reason why the
Court should not also use the relevant Thirteenth Amendment
precedents to inform the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry. The
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments restrict only governmental entities, while the Thirteenth Amendment is directed at private action. Nonetheless, the Enforcement Clauses of the three
Civil War Amendments are virtually identical.
The selfexecuting provisions of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are much narrower than the protections provided by Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. If anything, Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment should be given a broader
construction than the Enforcement Clauses of the other two Civil
War Amendments. The Court, however, has disregarded the deferential standard applied in Jones and Runyon when interpreting the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Lane, acknowledged the deference shown to Congress with regard to the deterrence of racial
discrimination. Nevertheless, he insisted that he would give
Congress such latitude in that limited context only because of
stare decisis.356 He never explained why Congress’s authority to
353
354
355
356

Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8 (2001).
Id. at 373.
Id. at 373–74.
Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2012 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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enforce other Fourteenth Amendment rights should be more circumscribed, aside from highlighting his own unwillingness to expand federal legislative jurisdiction.
Any objective observer must acknowledge that Congress’s
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is
not unlimited. It is true that Oregon v. Mitchell357 “found to be
beyond the § 5 power [a federal statute] that lowered the voting
age from twenty-one to eighteen in state elections.”358 Mitchell,
of course, preceded the adoption of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Nevertheless, most of the pre-Flores precedents interpreting the Enforcement Clauses of the Civil War Amendments generally applied a standard consistent with that described in
McCulloch, and the Court’s recent departure from that trend is
unfortunate. The Court certainly did not apply such a deferential standard in Flores, College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid,
Kimel, Morrison and Garrett. Perhaps Hibbs, Lane and Goodman represent the beginning of a larger retreat on the part of the
Court. Since the Constitution grants the enforcement power to
Congress rather than to the courts, one can only hope that the
pendulum is beginning to swing back in the direction of those
elected by the people of the United States.
IV. THE COURT’S ASSERTION OF ITS OWN PROPHYLACTIC POWER
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[t]he
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.”359 Nothing in the Constitution says
anything about entrusting a similar power to the federal courts.
Notwithstanding this reality, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
has sometimes prescribed prophylactic rules of its own.
Among the most famous prophylactic rules created by the
Court is the one requiring that Miranda warnings be given to a
criminal suspect prior to the commencement of custodial interrogation. Before custodial interrogation can begin, a suspect must
be verbally warned that he or she “has the right to remain silent,
that anything he [or she] says can be used against him [or her] in
a court of law, that he [or she] has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he [or she] cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him [or her] prior to any questioning if he
[or she] so desires.”360 These warnings are required under the
Court’s 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona.361 Confessions ob357
358
359
360
361

400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2012 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
Id.
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tained in violation of Miranda cannot be admitted into evidence
as a part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief against the defendant.362
The warning requirement enunciated in Miranda is a prophylactic rule designed to enforce the Self-Incrimination Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, of course, incorporates the SelfIncrimination Clause and makes it applicable to the states.363
Prior to Miranda, the Court evaluated the admissibility of a suspect’s confession, for constitutional purposes, under a “voluntariness test.”364 There are two distinct bases for the requirement
that confessions be voluntary in order to admit them into evidence. The first basis, recognized in Bram v. United States, is
the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.365 The
second basis, discussed in Brown v. Mississippi, is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.366 It is worthy of note
that the Fifth Amendment contains its own Due Process Clause,
providing a similar voluntariness protection to federal defendants.367 Nevertheless, the Court ultimately became convinced
that new custodial interrogation techniques had begun to blur
the line between voluntary and involuntary confessions, requiring more “concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow.”368 Therefore, the Court created
the prophylactic exclusionary rule of Miranda, barring the admission of confessions made during custodial interrogation before
the giving of the warnings.
Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 18
U.S.C. § 3501.369 The statute was designed to alter the rule of
Miranda in criminal prosecutions brought by the United States
or the District of Columbia. Under Miranda, the required warnings had to be given in order for a suspect’s confession made during custodial interrogation to be introduced as evidence by the
prosecution at trial. Section 3501(a) stated that, “[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall
be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”370 Section

362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369

Id.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000).
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000), invalidated by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428

370

§ 3501(a).

(2000).
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3501(e) defined the word “confession” as “any confession of guilt
of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made
or given orally or in writing.”371 The factors to be used by the
trial judge to determine whether a given confession was voluntary were enumerated in § 3501(b). These factors included all
relevant “circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,
including . . . the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment
of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment . . . .”372 Inquiries were also mandated to determine
whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he
was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession, . . . whether or not such defendant was advised or knew
that he was not required to make any statement and that any such
statement could be used against him, . . . whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and . . . whether or not such defendant was without
the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.373

Finally, § 3501(b) made it clear that the presence or absence of
any of the enumerated factors was not necessarily “conclusive on
the issue of voluntariness of the confession.”374
The U.S. Supreme Court was ultimately called upon to decide whether § 3501 was valid federal legislation in Dickerson v.
United States.375 Charles Thomas Dickerson was indicted for
several offenses under Title 18 of the United States Code, including “bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using
a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence . . . .”376
Prior to his trial, he moved for the suppression of a statement
that he had made during a custodial interrogation session at a
Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, contending that no
one had given him Miranda warnings before the questioning
commenced. Although the District Court granted his motion, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on interlocutory appeal by the Government, holding that the matter was
governed by § 3501 rather than by Miranda.377 The Court of Appeals reasoned that Congress had the authority to substitute
§ 3501’s voluntariness test for the prophylactic warning rule be371
372
373
374
375
376
377

(2000).

§ 3501(e).
§ 3501(b).
Id.
Id.
530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
Id. at 432.
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d 530 U.S. 428
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cause Miranda was not a constitutional holding. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, and ultimately reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.378
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion of the
Court in Dickerson, explained that “Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules
of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution.”379 Citing Flores, he declared that Congress did not have
the power to legislatively supersede the Court’s decisions “interpreting and applying the Constitution.”380 The outcome of the
case was left to turn on the question of “whether the Miranda
Court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction.”381
Moving on to address the critical issue, Chief Justice
Rehnquist made it clear that Miranda had announced a constitutional rule that Congress could not alter. He explained that the
Miranda Court had
emphasized that it could not foresee “the potential alternatives for
protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the
States,” and [that] it [had] accordingly opined that the Constitution
would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were “at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”382

Nevertheless, it was likewise noted that the Miranda Court had
“concluded that something more than the totality test was necessary” to enforce the Self-Incrimination Clause.383 Since § 3501
reinstated the totality of the circumstances test without providing additional protection, it was found to be unconstitutional.
Another reason relied on by the Court to assert the constitutional status of Miranda was the fact that the warning requirement had been applied to state prosecutions. The U.S. Supreme
Court, of course, does not have “a supervisory power over the
courts of the several States,” and its authority with respect to
state criminal proceedings is “limited to enforcing the commands
of the United States Constitution.”384 Consequently, Miranda’s
direct application to the states meant that it was a constitutional
378
379
380
381
382
383
384

Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 440 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
Id. at 442.
Id. at 438 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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threshold to be applied uniformly to both the states and the federal government, not simply an exercise of the Court’s supervisory authority over the federal courts.
Finally, the Court rejected the Government’s contention that
the exceptions carved into Miranda’s exclusionary rule had undermined its constitutional status. Such exceptions included the
rule enunciated in Oregon v. Hass, which held that a confession
obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony if he or she takes the stand, assuming
that the confession was otherwise voluntary.385 Another exception relied on by the United States was the rule announced in
New York v. Quarles, which permitted the admission of statements made by a detained suspect in response to police questioning that was deemed to be necessary to protect the public from
immediate danger.386 The Court declared that these exceptions
to Miranda’s exclusionary rule did not destroy its status as a
constitutional rule. Instead, the Court asserted that “no constitutional rule is immutable.”387 Because the Court found that
Miranda was a constitutional precedent, it governed the result in
Dickerson. Explaining that “Miranda has become embedded in
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture,” the Court declined the Government’s invitation to overrule Miranda.388 Therefore, Congress
was without the constitutional authority to enact § 3501.
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kennedy and
O’Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion.389
Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Thomas.390 Questioning the Court’s authority to invalidate
§ 3501, Justice Scalia characterized the Court’s decision in
Dickerson as an assertion of “the power, not merely to apply the
Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful
‘prophylactic’ restrictions upon Congress and the States.”391 He
insisted that, since Miranda, the Court had “interpreted that decision as having announced, not the circumstances in which custodial interrogation runs afoul of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment, but rather only ‘prophylactic’ rules that go beyond
the right against compelled self-incrimination.”392 Relying on
Quarles, he declared that the warnings prescribed by Miranda
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392

420 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1975).
467 U.S. 649 (1984).
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 444 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 450.
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were “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.”393
Quoting the Court’s prior decision in Oregon v. Elstad, Justice
Scalia explained: “Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.”394
Seeking to further illustrate his view that the decision in
Dickerson was an excess of the Court’s authority, Justice Scalia
contended that “[w]here the Constitution has wished to lodge in
one of the branches of the Federal Government some limited
power to supplement its guarantees, it has said so.”395 That
statement, of course, was a reference to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. He went on to state that “[t]he power with
which the Court would endow itself under a ‘prophylactic’ justification for Miranda goes far beyond what it has permitted Congress to do under authority of that text.”396 Justice Scalia asserted that while congressional action under the Enforcement
Clause could be used only to deter actual violations of the Constitution, the Court’s “power to embellish” permitted it to prescribe
prophylactic measures against “foolhardy” confessions as well as
“constitutionally prohibited compelled confessions.”397 In so stating, he referred to the “congruence and proportionality” test established in Flores.
Notwithstanding the observations made by Justice Scalia in
Dickerson, the prophylactic rule enunciated by the Court in
Miranda would likely pass Flores’ “congruence and proportionality” test if it were enacted by Congress pursuant to Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court created Miranda’s exclusionary rule to deter actual violations of the SelfIncrimination Clause, which is incorporated within the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, it
was mandated by a judicial decision rather than by federal legislation. Even though the Enforcement Clause gives the prophylactic power to Congress, the Court has chosen to seize that
power for itself. Since Dickerson was a federal case, the Fourteenth Amendment was not applicable and the Fifth Amendment’s application was direct. Despite that fact, it is clear that
the exclusionary rule’s application in state cases influenced the
Court’s decision. In light of Miranda and Dickerson, it is apparent that the Court has confused its own duty to give effect to the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in a spe393
394
395
396
397

Id. at 452 (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)).
Id. at 453 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985)).
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id. at 461.

49-118 KOVALCHICK.DOC

110

12/26/2006 11:15:01 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:49

cific case with Congress’s power to enforce those provisions by
enacting prophylactic legislation.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Judiciary’s assault on Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment threatens the rights of Americans all across the country. The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions limiting Congress’s Enforcement Clause authority are
particularly troubling in light of the Court’s reaffirmation of its
own prophylactic power in Dickerson. In spite of the decisions
sustaining sweeping legislation under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court has inexplicably given Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment a much more narrow construction. While it cannot be doubted that each of the Civil War
Amendments provides a unique scope of substantive protection,
the Court has never explained why these similarly worded enforcement provisions have been given such drastically different
constructions.
Legislation to enforce one constitutional guarantee, of
course, cannot itself conflict with another. For instance, Congress’s authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment cannot be
used to require the states to make race the “predominant factor”
in redistricting decisions. Under Miller v. Johnson,398 the Equal
Protection Clause forbids the use of race as the “predominant factor” for purposes related to the composition of legislative districts.399 Congress does not have the authority to authorize violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.400 Legislative enactments
designed to enforce the Civil War Amendments, like all other enactments, must not themselves violate the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the presence of some limitations, however,
Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
should be viewed more broadly than the Flores standard permits.
In McCulloch, the Court construed the words “necessary and
proper”401 in a manner which gave Congress wide latitude to enact federal legislation, rejecting the contention that the word
“necessary” meant “absolutely or indispensably necessary.”402
The word “appropriate,” as it appears in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, cannot reasonably be construed to be more
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment: When Can Race Be Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW, 735, 736 (2002) (discussing the “predominant factor” test).
400 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 490 (1999).
401 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
402 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819).
398
399
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restrictive of Congress’s authority than the word “necessary” in
the Necessary and Proper Clause. The propriety of legislation is
a political judgment for Congress to make.
Justice Kennedy, who authored the opinion of the Court in
Flores and introduced the “congruence and proportionality” test,
took a contrary position during his confirmation hearings before
the Senate Judiciary Committee. When questioned by Senator
Arlen Specter about the U.S. Supreme Court’s status as the final
arbiter of the Constitution, then-Judge Kennedy stated that
Congress would have the legislative authority to provide newspapers with heightened protection from libel suits if New York
Times v. Sullivan403 were overruled.404 He believed that Congress had the authority to bring back the “actual malice” standard by statute if the Court were to reject it as a matter of constitutional law.405 He made it clear that, in his view, Congress
“could make that judgment as a constitutional matter.”406 Needless to say, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, though governing a different subject, sought to accomplish an objective similar to that described in Judge Kennedy’s hypothetical. While
Congress lacks the power to overrule the Court’s decisions interpreting the Constitution, its prophylactic power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment should be viewed as broad
enough to sustain a statute such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
The lack of deference shown to Congress’s determinations
about what is “appropriate legislation” to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment should meet an aggressive legislative response.
Even without resorting to the constitutional amendment process
established by Article V, Congress has several options available.
Primarily, Congress should look for alternative sources of legislative jurisdiction to accomplish its objectives. For example, the
Court concluded in Oregon v. Mitchell that Congress exceeded its
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
when it lowered the minimum voting age from twenty-one to
eighteen in state elections.407 Mitchell, of course, was decided before the adoption of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Section One
of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment states that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older,
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by

403
404
405
406
407

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1395–96 (4th ed. 1995).
Id. at 1396.
Id.
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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any State on account of age.”408 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment
itself accomplished what the statute sought to do, making further
substantive legislation unnecessary. Section Two of the TwentySixth Amendment states that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”409 It is very similar
to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, so it probably
could be used to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under the rationale of Fitzpatrick. If a state were to discriminate against eighteen- to twenty-year-olds with respect to
electoral matters, Congress could use Section Two of the TwentySixth Amendment to subject that state to suits brought by private individuals in federal court to redress the alleged constitutional violations. The same principle would apply to the Enforcement Clauses of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth and TwentyFourth Amendments.
Congress has the power of the purse and, therefore, can use
the Taxing and Spending Clause to accomplish many of its objectives. Under South Dakota v. Dole, Congress is empowered to
condition the receipt of federal funds on the states’ compliance
with certain policy directives.410 Perhaps Congress should use
this power more aggressively in order to meet some of its broader
objectives.
There are already signs that Congress is using this power,
along with its powers under other constitutional provisions, to
achieve objectives similar to those that prompted the enactment
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. For instance, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000411 attempts to mitigate the damage to religious freedom that was
done by the Smith and Flores decisions. The Act states:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, . . . even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and . . . is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.412

This legislative mandate
applies in any case in which . . . the substantial burden is imposed in
a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance;
or . . . [in which] the substantial burden affects, or removal of that

408
409
410
411
412

U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
Id.
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000dd-1 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000).
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substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, or with Indian tribes.413

It is clear from the language of the statute that Congress sought
to use its powers under the Spending Clause, as well as its powers under the Foreign, Interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses,
to compensate for the narrow construction given to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause in Flores. A similar
provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act restricts governmental land use regulations that substantially burden the ability of people to freely exercise their religion.414
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
held that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.415 Justice Ginsburg, who delivered the opinion of
the Court, noted that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act at
issue in Flores had “lacked a Commerce Clause underpinning or
a Spending Clause limitation to recipients of federal funds.”416
Nevertheless, she made it clear that the Court was not deciding
whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act was a valid exercise of the Commerce and Spending Clauses,
thereby limiting the Court’s holding in Cutter to the Establishment Clause issue.417 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit had found the Act to be in violation of the Establishment
Clause, making an inquiry into the bases for legislative jurisdiction unnecessary.418 The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing the
Court of Appeals, found the “institutionalized-persons provision
compatible with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise.”419 Since the Court of Appeals never addressed the Spending and Commerce Clause issues, the U.S. Supreme Court did
not address them either.
In any event, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act is undoubtedly valid under both constitutional provisions. Under Dole, Congress has wide latitude to condition the
receipt of federal funds on the states’ compliance with certain
federal legislative mandates. In the alternative scenario, the Act
contains a jurisdictional element that limits its application to a
413
414
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418

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000).
125 S. Ct. 2113, 2123 (2005).
Id. at 2118.
Id. at 2120 n.7.
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 268–69 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d 125 S. Ct. 2113
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discrete category of cases in which commerce is affected. Such a
jurisdictional element was lacking in the Gun-Free School Zones
Act at issue in Lopez and the Violence Against Women Act at issue in Morrison. The breadth of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause was illustrated by the Court’s recent decision
in Gonzales v. Raich, which held that the power vested in Congress by the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause “includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and
use of marijuana in compliance with [state] law.”420 In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that, “[w]here necessary to
make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress
may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.”421
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.422

As the Court noted in Missouri v. Holland: “Acts of Congress are
the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States.”423 Consequently, treaties
can be used to expand federal legislative jurisdiction. In order to
bring back the Violence Against Women Act that was invalidated
in Morrison, President George W. Bush could sign a treaty with a
foreign power that pledges each nation to take the steps necessary to protect women from gender-motivated violence. The Senate could proceed to give its advice and consent to the treaty pursuant to Article II. At that point, a new source of legislative
jurisdiction would come into being. Such a treaty may not be
self-executing for purposes of the standard discussed in Foster &
Elam v. Neilson424 and United States v. Percheman,425 but the
Necessary and Proper Clause would give Congress the power to
enact legislation designed to implement the treaty. Congress
could enact a statute identical to the one invalidated in Morrison,
thereby creating a cause of action under federal law for victims of
gender-motivated violence. It could be called the Violence
Against Women Treaty Act, and it would be “necessary and
420
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125 S. Ct. 2195, 2199 (2005).
Id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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proper for carrying into Execution”426 the President’s powers under the Treaty Clause.
There are also more direct ways in which Congress could
confront the federal courts. In Nixon v. United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that challenges to the procedures used by
the Senate to try impeachment cases present nonjusticiable political questions.427 The same is likely true of challenges to the
grounds for impeachment, particularly since Article I gives the
House of Representatives “the sole Power of Impeachment” and
the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”428 Therefore, federal courts have no constitutional authority to review
impeachment determinations made by the House and Senate.429
If the House were to bring impeachment charges against a federal judge, the only recourse available to that judge would be an
argument for acquittal in the Senate. If the Senate were to convict such a judge and effectuate his or her removal from office,
such a determination would likely be final and incapable of review. Notwithstanding the overtly confrontational nature of the
impeachment process and the political pressures that sometimes
prevent its use, it remains an option available to Congress when
judges evade their responsibilities or usurp legislative authority.
Congress also has the power to regulate the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Congress can use this power to keep the
courts in check, as it did during the events leading up to Ex parte
McCardle.430 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court was unable to
reach the merits because Congress had repealed the underlying
jurisdictional statute. As the Court explained, “[j]urisdiction is
the power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause.”431 Congress can deal with judicial excesses by amending the jurisdictional statutes that give the federal courts their power to decide cases and order relief.
Finally, the option once proposed by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt remains available to Congress at all times. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1 states that “[t]he Supreme Court of the United States shall
consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate
justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”432 Since the
Constitution prescribes no number, Congress has the power to
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
506 U.S. 224, 228, 238 (1993).
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.
Joseph R. Thysell, Senate Rule XI and the Impeachment of Federal Judges, 29 S.U.
L. REV. 77, 82 (2001) (discussing judicial review of Senate impeachment proceedings).
430 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
431 Id. at 514.
432 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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create more seats on the U.S. Supreme Court. Such a move
would, of course, dilute the importance of the votes of the existing
members of the Court. The fact that there are nine Justices is
solely the result of a statutory mandate. There is no constitutional impediment to a federal law designed to pack the Court.
There is a political equilibrium in Washington that usually
prevents Congress from taking these drastic steps. With two major political parties and countless other factions comprising a diverse Congress, it is unlikely that any significant legislative initiatives to curtail abuses by the federal courts will pass in the
near future. Each party or faction is afraid that another will
reap the benefits of a stronger Congress, and this dynamic prevents the body as a whole from acting to reassert its authority.
In any event, Congress must not remain impotent when its
authority is undermined. For an entire decade, Congress has
seen the Judiciary restrict Congress’s powers in a relentless
manner. Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Hibbs,
Lane and Goodman are a sign that the Court is finally starting to
retreat. Time will ultimately tell if this is the case. Chief Justice
John G. Roberts, Jr., and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., have now
replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, and the
direction that the Court will take in the future remains uncertain. Perhaps the Court’s two newest members will show more
deference to Congress than Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor did, thereby decreasing tensions between America’s
legislators and jurists. If the Court continues to usurp Congress’s authority, however, Congress will have no choice other
than to act.
That is not to say that all judges deserve to be condemned.
Most members of the Judiciary serve the American people with
the highest level of respect for our constitutional tradition. Nevertheless, the same is true of those who serve as elected officials.
The power that they exercise comes from the people who elect
them, and our Constitution confirms that “We the People” are the
ultimate authority in this country.433 Congress simply cannot
remain silent when unelected judges usurp the authority of the
people. While judges are entitled to respect when they carry out
their role in the constitutional design, they must learn to show a
greater degree of respect for America’s elected officials. The
courts, after all, have no real power to enforce their decisions.
They rely on the Executive Branch to enforce their judgments,
and the Executive Branch has to rely on Congress to supply the
needed resources. Under our Constitution, there are three co433
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equal branches of government, none of which is superior to the
others.

